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ABSTRACT 
KYUNG JIN LIM: Essays on Green Markets and Green Marketing 
(Under the direction of Dr. Sridhar Balasubramanian and Dr. Pradeep Bhardwaj) 
 
 Firms develop and market their environment-friendly activities not only to contribute 
to society but, more importantly, to be perceived as environmentally responsible, capture the 
willingness to pay of green consumers, and increase profits. At the same time, many firms 
are convinced that the associated increase in costs and uncertain financial benefits will erode 
their competitiveness. Environmental developments require firms to identify the sources of 
improvement and make appropriate adjustments, which often entail extensive analyses and 
costly alterations. The difficulty in measuring emissions along the entire supply chain and the 
unclear market response make it difficult for firms to manage their environmental initiatives. 
Furthermore, with recent developments in markets for greenhouse gas emissions, firms are 
faced with the task of strategically managing a portfolio of internal and external approaches 
to optimizing their environmental performance.  
 The first essay of this dissertation provides a market-based synthesis of the possible 
opportunities for green within and across a firm’s business model. A review of operationally 
internal approaches to environmental management, advancements in external carbon markets, 
managerial and operational issues involved, and demand-side implications are discussed. In 
the second essay, an empirical investigation is first conducted on the market-side response to 
product carbon footprints and carbon offsetting claims. Based on the findings, a theoretical 
model is then developed to understand how a firm, faced with a market where consumers 
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differentially value distinct carbon footprint-reducing approaches, can manage its portfolio of 
environmental initiatives. In the third essay, a theoretical model is developed to investigate 
the impact of the voluntary carbon market and the resulting availability of carbon offsetting 
as a footprint-reducing initiative on competition and the environment. Taken together, this 
dissertation provides an outline of the areas of green, both internal and external to a firm’s 
operations, and the influence of the voluntary carbon market on firms’ environmental 
management strategies. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 Average global temperature since 1900, an increase of 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit, added 
to the severity and frequency of weather-related phenomena such as higher temperatures, 
altered precipitation, and extreme weather events. Most climate models predict a three- to 
eight-degree rise in global average temperature if atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases reach twice pre-industrial levels, something that is expected to happen by 2050 if 
current trends continue (Lash and Wellington 2007). In 2010, human economic activity in the 
U.S. alone produced 6.8 billion metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalents of greenhouse gas 
emissions (EPA 2011). While the developed world is largely responsible for the cumulated 
emissions to date, this situation is exacerbated by the rapid industrialization of developing 
economies and is expected to lead to even higher levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases.  
 A distinct outcome enhanced by climate change is the establishment of a new global 
market in atmospheric pollution, emission credits, and emission abatement technologies. 
Specifically, a market in greenhouse gas emission allowances (the so-called carbon market) 
has developed with annual trading in assets valued at tens of billions of dollars (Lash and 
Wellington 2007). The advancement of this market has been enhanced, in part, by external 
regulatory pressures as well as internal market changes. Governments around the world are 
increasingly enacting policies that place a cost on emissions and require companies to reduce 
and recover their negative externalities. Many European nations have already passed laws 
requiring firms to set up systems for taking back and recovering value from their products at 
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end of use, and while the U.S. experiments with market-based systems for rewarding firms 
that go beyond reducing their emissions, the European Union has already established the 
Emission Trading Scheme restricting firms from emitting certain specified greenhouse gases. 
 In addition to regulatory pressure, climate change is shaping markets and consumer 
demand. Increasing number of shareholders already considers environmental impact when 
measuring financial success, and environmental improvements are being rewarded in the 
stock market. Consumers also take firm’s environmental efforts into account when making 
purchasing decisions. More and more companies are being held responsible for the social 
consequences of their activities by various government, social, and consumer groups, and 
despite sometimes questionable methods, corporate rankings on their social responsibility 
attract considerable publicity (Porter and Kramer 2006). In addition, investors have begun to 
demand more disclosure from companies. For example, the Carbon Disclosure Project, a 
coalition of institutional investors representing more than US $31 trillion in assets, annually 
request information from firms about their climate-risk positioning (Lash and Wellington 
2007). In response, entrepreneurs and corporate managers are beginning to realize the need to 
develop innovative and effective environmental strategies that will enable them to position 
and take advantage of business opportunities.  
 Companies can find advantage in the emerging climate change transition by altering 
products to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, trading emission credits, and marketing new 
management skills or technologies that generate less emission (Hoffman 2005). Firms need 
not wait for a technological revolution to implement sustainable and profitable practices and 
indeed the quest for sustainability is already starting to change the competitive landscape, 
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requiring firms to change the way they think about products, processes, technologies, and 
business models (Nidumolu et al. 2009).  
 Against this backdrop, this dissertation is composed as follows. In Essay 1, a market-
based synthesis of what has been done in the various areas incorporating green is provided. 
Areas of environmental improvements both internal and external to a firm’s operations, the 
relevant managerial and operational issues, and more importantly, their market-side 
implications are discussed. This enables an overview of a firm’s entire value chain and how 
environmental issues and initiatives are embedded at each stage and level. Such a framework 
can enable managers to identify the various green decisions they can be involved in and 
employ across various stages as well as the associated marketplace implications.  
In Essay 2, a closer look is taken to understand how a firm, faced with a market 
where consumers differentially value the firm’s distinct environment management schemes, 
can strategically manage a portfolio of product carbon footprint-reducing initiatives. An 
empirical investigation is first conducted to understand consumer perceptions of different 
environmental approaches, the findings from which are incorporated into a theoretical model 
of a firm’s decisions regarding operationally internal and external product carbon footprint-
reducing initiatives. Knowledge on the relationship between internal approaches and product 
quality, operationally independent alternatives to managing product carbon footprints, and 
consumer heterogeneity in their valuation for distinct green approaches can inform a firm’s 
design of an ideal portfolio of green initiatives. 
Essay 3 focuses specifically on the advancement of the voluntary carbon market and 
how this external emission-reducing mechanism impacts competition and the environment. A 
theoretical model is developed to understand how firms, competing in an established market 
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with existing products, respond when given the option to engage in carbon offsetting as a 
method to reduce their product carbon footprints, become more environment-friendly, and 
capture the willingness to pay of consumers. Comparing the results between an asymmetric 
and a widespread adoption of carbon offsetting on firm profits and aggregate emission can 
provide an understanding of the conditions under which carbon offsetting leads to a win-win 
outcome or become a necessary evil. 
Taken together, this dissertation provide an overview of the potential areas of green 
within and across a firm’s business model, their market-side responses, and the implications 
of the voluntary carbon market and carbon offsetting mechanism on a firm’s green portfolio, 
competition, and the environment.  
 
  
CHAPTER 2 
ESSAY 1. UNDERSTANDING GREEN MARKETS AND GREEN INITIATIVES 
2.1 Introduction 
Increasing corporate attention is being paid to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and 
making operations more ‘green.’ More than 8,500 corporations in over 135 countries have 
adopted the Global Compact aimed at making their operations more socially responsible (UN 
Global Compact 2011), and many CEOs believe that businesses must address climate change 
(Bielak et al. 2007). Firms have introduced various environmentally friendly offerings such 
as green electricity, sustainably harvested produce, and low-emission vehicles, and more than 
40,000 products produced by over 2,400 U.S. manufacturers have been labeled with Energy 
Star, indicating their energy efficiency (Energy Star 2008). These initiatives are now viewed 
as key drivers of financial performance (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006).   
 At the same time, many firms are convinced that the increase in cost and inability to 
materialize their environmental efforts will erode their competitiveness (Nidumolu et al. 
2009). Environmental developments require firms to (1) identify sources of improvements 
and (2) make appropriate adjustments, which can range from changes in supplier relations to 
operational alterations. Identification and measurement of the atmospheric impact at various 
stages of the operational process may require extensive analyses, which not all firms have the 
capacity or slack to undertake. Although there are several tools such as enterprise carbon 
management, carbon and energy footprint analysis, and life-cycle assessments, the additional 
costs and unclear immediate financial benefits result in many executives behaving as though 
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they have to choose between the social benefits of developing sustainable products/processes 
and the financial costs of doing so (Nidumolu et al. 2009). However, becoming environment-
friendly can lower costs through reductions in inputs and efficient manufacturing, generate 
additional revenues from better products, and open new business opportunities (Nidumolu et 
al. 2009). 
Research on the various environmental initiatives includes green design, production 
planning and control for remanufacturing, product recovery, reverse logistics management, 
green purchasing, and industry ecology. These studies are mostly found in the operations and 
environmental engineering and economics literature with a general focus on supply chain 
management. For example, studies on green design emphasizes environmentally conscious 
design and life-cycle assessment of products and includes design for material and product 
recovery (e.g. Guide and van Wassenhove 2001; Melissen and de Ron 1999), design for 
disassembly (e.g. Laperriere and ElMaraghy 1992; Moore et al. 1998), and design for waste 
minimization (e.g. Jahre 1995; Jayaraman et al. 2003). Another stream of research revolves 
around green operations and includes operational aspects related to reverse logistics and 
network design, green manufacturing and remanufacturing, and product return and inventory 
management (for a review, see Srivastava 2007). 
 So far, the area of remanufacturing has received the most attention. Aspects of 
product/material recovery including categorization of product recovery, classification of 
different stages in remanufacturing, and evaluation of the product recovery process have 
been looked into (e.g. Krikke et al. 1998; Goldsby and Closs 2000; Thierry et al. 1995). The 
financial impact of reverse logistic strategies and the integration of reverse logistic activities 
within an organization have also been studied (Srivastava and Srivastava 2005). Also, key 
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challenges such as integrating remanufacturing with internal operations (Ferrer and Whybark 
2001), integrating product design, product take-back, and supply chain incentives (Guide and 
van Wassenhove 2006), understanding competition among remanufacturers (Majumder and 
Groenevelt 2001), and integrating remanufacturing and reverse logistics with supply chain 
design (e.g., Fleischmann et al. 2001; Savaskan et al. 2004) have been looked into (for a 
review, see Srivastava 2007). 
On the other hand, marketing and management literature has focused on consumer 
characteristics including environmental consciousness and altruism as well as the influence 
of factors such as personal and social norms and attitude toward corporate green initiatives 
on product valuation and purchase behaviors. These studies have shown consumers to be 
sensitive to and rewarding toward socially beneficial initiatives (e.g., Arora and Henderson 
2007; Sen and Bhattacharya 2001) and provide support for corporate green initiatives as 
drivers of financial performance (e.g., Luo and Bhattacharya 2006; van Beurden and 
Gossling 2008). At the same time, differences in consumer receptiveness toward green 
initiatives, possible skepticism toward corporate green claims (Ottman et al. 2006), and their 
negative impact on firm performance has also been looked at (e.g., Darke and Ritchie 2007; 
Wagner et al. 2009).  
 In sum, the sources of waste within the supply chain and the different operational 
approaches in reducing environmental impact from manufacturing as well as in recapturing 
value from end-of-life products has been researched extensively. However, these studies are 
scattered across several domains and are mostly operationally focused on supply chain 
management. And while the importance of green developments on consumers’ perceptions 
and demand have readily been acknowledged, there is no synthetic work incorporating these 
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market-side implications within the firm’s value chain. In order to gain a competitive 
advantage, managers need not only to be able to identify the areas in which firms can focus 
their environmental efforts but also to understand how the different green initiative within 
and across the firm’s domain can affect markets and consumers.  
 The following essay provides a market-based synthesis of what has been done in the 
various areas incorporating green. First, an overview is provided of environmentally sensitive 
markets, their characteristics, and their response to corporate green initiatives. Then, various 
environmental opportunities within the supply chain across product design, purchasing and 
supply management, manufacture, and distribution and logistics management are discussed. 
In addition to operationally internal approaches, the voluntary carbon market and aspects 
specific to this external mechanism are considered. Figure 1 provides a framework of the 
topics discussed in this essay – the areas of environmental development within the business 
model, the associated resource and waste flow, and their relationship with the market.  
 From a managerial standpoint, understanding consumer response to corporate green 
initiatives is the key to realizing a competitive and profitable environmental development.  
This essay enables an overview of a firm’s entire value chain and how environmental issues 
and initiatives are embedded at each stage and level and the relevant demand-side issues. 
Such a synthesis will enable managers to identify the various green decisions they can be 
involved in and employ at various stages as well as the resulting market implications.  
2.2 Green Consumption 
 Increasing global concern for the environment has led to an increase in the number of 
individuals incorporating environmental aspects into their everyday decisions including the 
products they consume and the firms from which they purchase. Widely recognized as ‘green’ 
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consumers, these individuals take environmental elements into consideration when making 
purchase decisions in markets such as organic produce (Loureiro et al. 2002; Moon et al. 
2002), socially responsible investments (Michelson et al. 2004), and green electricity (Roe et 
al. 2001). Green consumers are willing to pay a premium for the provision and protection of 
public goods and, more importantly, their environmental concern extends beyond product 
ingredients and encompasses aspects of manufacturing, usage, and even disposal (e.g., Auger 
et al. 2003; Ginsberg and Bloom 2004). In short, green consumers care not only about how 
environment-friendly individual products are but also about the processes through which the 
products are produced, consumed, and disposed of. 
 A distinct quality of green consumers is their ability to make relevant connections 
between environmental issues and their lives (Schlegelmilch et al. 1996). In addition to being 
aware, green consumers are able to link environmental issues to the products they purchase 
and consume. Attitude toward an issue and the extent to which consumers believe that their 
decisions can have a meaningful impact strengthen the connection between environmental 
issues and consumer response such as intention of use and purchase behavior (e.g., Rios et al. 
2006; Straughan and Roberts 1999; Gupta and Ogden 2009; Peattie 2001; Sen and 
Bhattacharya 2001). Collectively, research on green consumers has established concern for 
environmental aspects, relevance with purchase decisions, and perceived effectiveness as 
factors that influence these consumers in making environment-conscious purchase decisions.  
Valuation 
 The values derived in green decision-making can be aligned with three of the value 
drivers recognized by Sheth et al. (1991): emotional, social and functional value (Green and 
Peloza 2011). Economic models account for the emotional value in green products through a 
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“warm glow” term. Traditional assumptions of rational actors in pursuit of self-interest can 
only explain a limited portion of environmentally conscious behavior and, in general, free-
riding is predicted for public goods. This is because green consumption is often motivated by 
altruistic, moral, and pro-social reasons. To better account for this, economic research has 
included an additional benefit to the contributors of public goods (consumers). Recognized as 
a “warm glow,” this benefit refers to the good/bad feeling from having positively/negatively 
contributed to society as a result of the purchase decisions. Derived from the theories of 
altruism (Andreoni 1990) and social decision-making (Akerlof 1997), “warm glow” reflects 
an environmental conscience, and has been shown to influence purchase and the demand for 
public goods (e.g., Cleveland et al. 2005; Popp 2001). 
 Research has also identified normative influences in green decision-making. For 
example, personal norms, the perceived responsibility for the consequence of one’s action, 
have been shown to shape environmentally conscious behavior in domains such as recycling 
(Vining and Ebreo 1992), energy adaptations (Black et al. 1985), and transportation methods 
(Bamberg and Schmidt 2003). ‘Spillover effects’ of personal norms have even been found 
across different environmental behaviors (Sparks and Shepard 1992). Similarly, self-concept 
– how one thinks of oneself as environmentally responsible – has been shown to influence 
green consumption, over and above the effect of attitude toward the environment and 
irrespective of past consumption practices (Thorgersen 1999).  
At the group-level, perceived social responsibility, influenced by perceptions of how 
other people behave (descriptive norms) and how others would approve/disapprove of my 
behavior (subjective norms) also affects environmental preference formation by inducing 
compliance without changing beliefs or attitudes (Pecotich and Rosenthal, 2001). The social 
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value in purchase decisions comes from the fact that people often make judgments about 
others based on the purchases they make (Yoon et al., 2006). Research on social sanctions
 
show, for example, that when contributions to public goods are motivated by the desire for 
social approval, the extent to which social norms are recognized plays an important role in 
the level of contribution (e.g., Rege 2004; Nyborg et al. 2006). Experimental studies also 
provide support for the influence of descriptive norms on the voluntary provision of public 
goods (e.g., Brekke et al. 2003, Reno et al. 1993).  
 In terms of functional value, while some environmental attributes are associated with 
providing a higher quality, most green products are perceived as being of a lower quality 
(Ginsberg and Bloom 2004). In fact, many attributes such as fuel efficiency and recyclability 
do have effects that conflict with traditional attributes, such as safety, material consistency, 
and convenience, which may pose challenges for managers trying to maintain satisfactory 
levels of both green and traditional attributes in one product (Chen 2001). More importantly, 
regardless of the actual relationship, consumers have been found to make inherent tradeoffs 
between environmental attributes and their perception of quality – i.e., consumers assumes 
lower quality of green products (Luchs et al. 2007). For firms that compete in markets where 
quality is important, positioning their products on their environmental attributes may damage 
the established perception of product quality (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). 
Even studies that directly address the relationship between a firm’s environmental 
conduct and product quality show mixed results. On the one hand are consumers who 
continue to purchase from firms with publicly known poor environmental records. This is in 
line with research that supports the relative importance of utilitarian attributes, where product 
quality is able to compensate for the lack of environmental performance (Kalafatis et al. 
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1994). On the other hand, “negative effects” also exist, where high product quality cannot 
compensate for a firm’s unethical actions and environmental attributes cannot compensate 
for inferior quality (e.g., Folkes and Kamins 1999; Barone et al. 2000). These results suggest 
that consumers may not perceive environmental attributes as independently additive to other 
product attributes, and in fact, perceive both product quality and environmental performance 
to be necessary – neither one can fully compensate for the other.  
Communication 
 Firms engage heavily in the communication of their environment-friendly activities 
through methods such as product labels, press releases, and firm reports to increase visibility 
and influence green consumers (Luo and Bhattacharya 2006). Developments in information 
technology now provide consumers with easy access to product- and firm-level information. 
While this can help facilitate the communication process for firms, if consumers perceive the 
information as profit-driven, the intended positive effect can be damaged and even lead to an 
unintended backlash (Roehm and Tybout, 2006). 
 In the absence of personal experience – as is the case with many green attributes – 
consumers rely on information available. At the broadest level, even the industry sector can 
provide inferences on a firm’s environmental conduct. Reports of unethical behavior by a 
competitor, for example, can create negative spillovers and evoke consumer criticism across 
all firms within the industry (Roehm and Tybout, 2006). Geographical associations such as 
origin of content, place of manufacture, or even the firm’s headquarters can also influence 
consumers’ beliefs about the firm’s social conduct (Brunk 2010). This is especially relevant 
for firms with a global supply base – strategic decisions based on cost-reduction and 
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competition can inadvertently create negative inferences for consumers on the environmental 
performance of firms.  
 The most widely used communication method is product labels. Although price has 
also been looked at as reflecting a product’s environmental aspects, unlike traditional price-
quality inferences, the relationship between environmental friendliness and price is not as 
obvious – whereas a low price can indicate poor environmental performance, a high price 
does not necessarily imply the opposite (Brunk 2010). On the other hand, research has 
readily established that consumers rely on product labels when making purchase decisions 
(Ibanez and Grolleau 2008). Consumers respond to the visual and textual information 
contained in product labels (Tang et al. 2004) and several studies provide evidence of the 
impact of eco-labels – claims on the environmental friendliness of products – on the 
consumption of frequently purchased goods (e.g., Bjorner et al. 2004; Teisl et al. 2002).  
However, eco-labeling is not clearly defined, can encompass different meanings, and are 
often labeled using different methods (Ibanez and Grolleau 2008).  For example, some labels 
are issued by independent organizations and displayed voluntarily by the firm who submits to 
inspection or in some way meet the organization’s environmental standards (e.g. Nordic 
Swan, Germany’s Blue Angel, and Green Seal in the U.S.). Other labels include claims 
related to environmentally friendly features (e.g., CFC free). These claims may be vague, 
undefined, unverified and unverifiable, and create consumer distrust and/or even scare away 
consumers (Ibanez and Grolleau 2008). 
The level of information contained within labels also influences consumer decisions. 
Providing more information can increase the perceived credibility of the label and improve 
consumers’ ability to make informed decisions (Teisl et al. 2002). At the same time, research 
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also indicates that adding more information can create information overload (Scammon 
1997). Revealing negative information regarding conventional products and emphasizing the 
benefits of green alternatives can seem beneficial from a marketing perspective. However, 
most firms that provide green products also offer conventional versions. For these firms, 
increasing information disclosure can potentially hurt their existing product lines. If properly 
executed, labels can aid consumers to make choices that clearly reflect their preferences. 
However, this can only be achieved if consumers notice, believe, understand, and can use the 
information presented to them. 
 In addition to product labels, external channels such as the media, consumer reports, 
and environmental groups also provide product- and firm-level information to consumers. 
With the increasing reach of these external channels, firms often face a tradeoff between the 
level of manageability and the credibility of the communicated messages (Du et al. 2010). 
This is because consumers are more critical of direct claims by the firm and often perceive 
them to be biased or in self-interest (Wiener et al. 1990). On the other hand, various external 
channels – which firms have little or no control over – are perceived by consumers as more 
credible and can be more effective from a marketing standpoint (Yoon et al. 2006). 
Credibility 
 The intangible nature of environmental initiatives and green product attributes makes 
claims on the environmental friendliness of firms/products highly susceptible to consumer 
skepticism. Reasons for skepticism can include broad cynicism on the effectiveness of the 
effort and/or on firm claims in general, and exposure to information on firms’ irresponsible 
conducts (Mohr et al. 1998; Vlachos et al. 2009). For example, confidence in the realized 
environmental benefit can increase consumers’ willingness to compromise and accept trade-
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offs (Peattie 2001). At the same time, consumers may be skeptical toward firms’ claims in 
general and perceive them as profit-driven. In fact, consumers who are most likely to engage 
in environmentally conscious behaviors have been found to be, by nature, more skeptical of 
advertising in general (Zinkhan and Carlson 1995). 
 In addition, although many firms develop and communicate their socially responsible 
activities, reports of irresponsible conduct and false claims by some firms – “Greenwashing” 
– give rise to consumer skepticism (Wagner et al. 2009). Furthermore, as firms globalize the 
length and complexity of their supply chains increases, adding to the difficulty in monitoring 
and managing the environmental impact of products and production processes (Wagner et al. 
2009). Consumers are likely to be exposed to inconsistent information about firm’s stated 
environmental initiatives and their actual practices. This is especially important since the 
effect of negative information has been shown to have stronger effects than positive 
information (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001; Trudel and Cotte 2009). 
Firms make increasing efforts to improve and market the environmental performance 
of their products and operations in order to contribute to environmental protection and, more 
importantly, to be perceived as environmentally responsible, capture consumer willingness to 
pay, and increase profits. However, as discussed above, market response to environmental 
developments can only be achieved with an understanding of what consumers respond to, 
how they value corporate green initiatives, and what the influencing factors and obstacles are.  
2.3 Internal Environmental Management 
Environmental management within a firm’s business model largely involves (1) 
efficient use of resources and (2) minimization of waste. Efficient use of tangible resources 
refers to minimizing the amount of physical materials used in the initial production of goods 
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as well as in reverse operations such as recycling, and remanufacturing. On the other hand, 
efficient management of intangible resources includes being able to extract, manufacture and 
distribute products with less energy, less processing, and in less time. Likewise, minimizing 
waste applies to both reducing material scrap as well as preventing and/or treating intangible 
environmental wastes such as atmospheric pollution. Both resource and waste management 
often have lasting effects across the entire business model and can be implemented at 
different stages within a firm’s operations and a product’s life. 
Environmental initiatives largely begin at the design stage and can impact subsequent 
stages of a product’s life and firms’ operations. Likewise, developments in the latter stages of 
the supply chain can have significant implications to the initial product design. Traditionally, 
firms have focused on environmental management at the product level across the stages prior 
to consumer purchase. These initiatives were centered on replacing the input materials with 
more environmentally sound substitutes. However, for many product categories such as 
energy-dependent appliances, environmental impact depends largely on post-purchase 
behaviors of consumption and product usage (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). To fully understand 
the total environmental impact associated with a product, post-production stages including 
consumption, collection, remanufacturing, and even disposal need to be considered. For 
example, recycling post-consumption products can simultaneously reduce material waste and 
the need for new inputs by substituting resources used in the production of new and 
remanufactured goods. This affects the environmental impact of the original product as well 
as of all goods that utilize the recovered materials. With the complex supply chains that many 
firms now possess, post-production operations and reverse channels, in addition to their 
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forward counterparts, play an ever important role in the overall environmental performance 
of firms.  
The strategic importance of supply chain management has increased even more with 
increased competition, global purchasing, and outsourcing of a firm’s core and/or non-core 
activities. The integration of environmental initiatives with supply chain management has 
gained attention not only as response mechanism to regulatory and market pressure but also 
as a way to gain a competitive advantage toward higher profits (Wilkerson 2005). Various 
concepts such as supply chain sustainability (Koplin et al. 2007), environmental management 
(Handfield et al. 2005), corporate greening (Preuss 2005), green supply (Vachon and Kalssen 
2006; Sarkis 2003) corporate social responsibility in supply chains (Maloni and Brown 2006), 
and environmental supply chain management (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001) are receiving 
growing attention in academia, media, and the corporate world.  
Green Design  
Interest in green design across disciplines has led to various concepts such as design 
for environment, eco-design, environmentally conscious design, life cycle design, and life 
cycle engineering (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). Regardless of the terminology, green design 
refers to the integration of environmental concerns and initiatives into the initial product 
design to eliminate in-process waste streams before they actually occur (Sroufe et al. 2000). 
Environmental decisions made up front can impact subsequent stages of the product’s life 
cycle as well as various operational stages including material selection, production, 
packaging, distribution, remanufacture, and even disposal. As such, the implementation of 
many green initiatives for products takes place early in the initial design or upgrade stages to 
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ensure that the total environmental effect is understood before subsequent and often non-
reversible decisions are made (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007).  
Foremost, decisions made in product design directly affect material selection. Desired 
product features impact the selection criteria for raw inputs, which, in addition to regulatory 
restrictions, the purchase department is faced with. Characteristics of the input materials are 
especially important for products, which do not require complex manufacturing and are 
produced closer to the consumer. Total environmental impact of these products depends, to a 
large extent, on the environmental friendliness of the raw inputs. On the other hand, for 
products that require more extensive manufacturing, total environmental impact also depends 
on process efficiency and associated waste streams generated during production. Green 
design for these products aims at making the production process more efficient – e.g., 
substituting to more manageable materials and designing products for ease-of-assembly. 
The consumption stage can also contribute substantially to the environmental impact 
of products. This is especially true for energy dependent and consumable goods (Gheorghe 
and Ishii 2007). Here, green design initiatives are focused on the product’s functionality and 
aims at reducing the amount of energy consumed and the consumables generated during the 
product’s lifetime. In general, there is a positive correlation between the energy consumption, 
cost of ownership and a negative impact on environment (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). Green 
design aimed at lowering the impact from post-purchase usage and consumption stages 
involve additional expenses, which are not able to create direct environmental benefits to the 
firm’s operations. This in itself provides little incentive for firms to makes efforts in this 
direction (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). However, the increased environmental awareness of 
consumers has put pressure on firms to reduce the energy consumed during usage and make 
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the product more energy efficient. For example, more than 35 percent of U.S households 
knowingly purchase Energy Star qualified products and more than 75 percent of these 
households report being favorably influenced by the Energy Star label (Energy Star 2008). 
Even in distribution, environmental impact is affected by product design. In addition 
to its role of protection and communication of the brand and product information, various 
aspects of packaging are affected by the design of products (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). For 
example, decisions that lead to the use of fragile materials and complex product constructions 
increase the resources required in the packaging and distribution of the final good, which is 
further intensified with increases in the transportation distance. Green design decisions must 
fully consider the potential tradeoffs between environment-friendly inputs and the associated 
increase in required packaging material. In fact, for many global firms with extensive 
transportation distances, substituting raw materials with potentially less environment-friendly 
but more rigid ones may even prove to be the more environmentally friendly initiative.  
In addition, green design can also help products become more robust with respect to 
end-of-life treatments and reverse channel operations (Gheorghe and Ishii 2007).  Regardless 
of the type of end-of-life treatment, common goals in green design for product end-of-life 
include high recyclability, economic efficiency, and minimal environmental impact 
(Gheorghe and Ishii 2007). High recyclability and economic efficiency involves selecting 
durable and reusable materials and designing products to facilitate disassembly and 
remanufacturing. Green design for minimal end-of-life impact refers to the use of inputs, 
which can be disposed of with less environmental damage such as biodegradable packaging 
and content. Even though these initiatives are aimed at making the end-of-life stages less 
environmentally harmful, they can often impose tradeoffs with the environmental 
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performance of a prior operational stage and even cause adverse effects. For example, 
designing products for disassembly can require additional, otherwise unnecessary, processing, 
where the waste generated outweigh the benefits of making the disassembly process more 
efficient.  
Decisions made in the design phase and the incorporation of environmental concerns 
into product design can have differential implications for each of the consecutive stages of 
the product’s life including its end-of-life. Approaches aimed at making one aspect of the 
product more environmentally friendly can even lead to a greater net environmental damage. 
For effective green design implementations, the design team must fully understand the firm’s 
entire business model, its operational stages and the associated flow of materials and waste. 
Collaboration and communication across the firm’s supply chain are essential for a complete 
understanding of the total immediate and eventual effect of product design decisions.  
Purchase Management 
Purchasing is positioned at the early stages of the supply chain and is responsible for 
material procurement (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001). As discussed in green design, the initial 
selection of inputs directly impacts the quality of the final good as well as the environmental 
performance in subsequent stages of the firm’s forward and backward operations. In addition, 
the characteristics of the inputs determine the nature of tangible waste streams generated 
throughout the production process and from the end-of-life disposal (Zsidisin and Siferd 
2001). Purchasing can also take part in equipment and technology  selection, which 
determine the energy efficiency and the level of atmospheric emissions generated throughout 
the production process (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001).  
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Externally, material selection is subject to various legal instruments restricting the use 
of environmentally harmful materials. For example, in the U.S, the RCRA regulation restricts 
the use of several hazardous and non-hazardous materials. Similarly, the European WEEE 
and RoHS regulate the treatment of end-of-life wastes, which are direct results of the 
materials selected up front. Even consumer agencies such as the U.S Consumer Product 
Safety Commission now regulate the sale and manufacture of more than 15,000 different 
consumer products from baby cribs to power tools. In response to external regulations and 
market pressure, many firms have established guidelines to help categorize materials in terms 
of their environmental soundness.  
Whether reactive or proactive, decisions made by the purchase department influence 
how the product can be designed and the type and level of treatments required in the initial 
production and remanufacture stages.  The role of environmental purchasing lies not only in 
the selection of environmentally friendly materials, but also in understanding and 
incorporating how the characteristics of the materials, within the product’s design, translate 
to environmental outcomes. 
Manufacture  
For many firms, the manufacturing system is where the highest volumes of resources 
are consumed and also where the greatest amount of emissions is generated (King and Lenox 
2002). The growing interest in global warming and the fast consumption of natural resources 
are motivating firms to change their manufacturing strategies and processes to become more 
environmentally friendly (Barreto et al. 2007). Environmentally responsible manufacturing is 
aimed at reducing or eliminating the use and generation of environmentally hazardous 
substances throughout the processing stages of a firm’s operations (Barreto et al. 2007). 
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Resource management within manufacturing can lead to additional cost saving and 
production increase. This is possible because efficient use of resources enables the firm to 
prevent unnecessary waste and save additional costs, which would otherwise have been 
required to treat and dispose of the waste. Firms can also reuse products or components and 
save costs in a similar manner. Although green manufacturing often does not directly impact 
the environmental quality of the products offered in the marketplace, if firms are able to 
efficiently use their resources, technological knowledge, and operations to implement 
environmental production practices, green manufacturing can help reduce costs, improve 
production lead times, and/or increase product quality and become a competitive advantage 
(Barreto et al. 2007).  
A direct consequence of a firm’s manufacturing operations, which has been receiving 
increasing interest over the past few years, is the amount of atmospheric emissions generated. 
Firms can minimize their emissions from production at both ends of the pipe. At the back end, 
firm can install filtration systems and scrubbing mechanisms to trap, store, treat, and/or 
recapture some of the emissions created throughout its operations. On the other hand, firms 
can engage in up front initiatives by investing in energy efficient technologies and equipment 
that generate less emission during their usage. Even though both approaches are internal to 
the firm’s operations and may not provide the end consumer with any tangible benefits, 
consumers still value how firms manage their environmental processes, independent of the 
quality or performance of the products or services sold (Orsato 2006). Some empirical 
studies have found positive relationships between green manufacturing, or efforts at green 
manufacturing, and firm reputation (Rusinko 2007). 
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Supply Management 
In addition to direct manufacturing, one of the core decisions by firms is whether to 
outsource parts of the firm’s core or non-core activities. Increased competition, cost pressures, 
and resource constraints have led many firms in developed countries to set priorities in their 
supplier selection criteria and switch their spending volumes to developing countries. What 
began as a predominantly cost-focused strategy has led to the emergence of truly global 
supply chains (Trent and Moneczka 2003). While it may guarantee lower unit costs, 
globalizing the supply chain can have significant implications for the firm’s environmental 
performance. For example, purchasing from suppliers in other countries increases the 
environmental impact from increased transportation distance and can require additional 
resources for packaging and handling. In addition, effective implementation of environmental 
initiatives by the purchasing firm can be hindered by the lack of control and difficulty in 
close monitoring of its global supply base. 
The relationship between a purchasing firm and its suppliers is generally bound under 
legal contracts, which govern how the firm conducts business with each supplier and has 
lasting effects on the firm’s operations (Reaume 2010; Tsoulfas and Pappis 2006). Typically, 
contracts are focused on quality control and financial agreements, and firms have almost no 
legal responsibility toward the environmental activities of their suppliers. The purchasing 
firm may be liable for the materials purchased, but are generally not responsible for other 
activities by their suppliers (Hall 2000). As such, efforts to improve their environmental 
performance by firms can easily be broken down by poor environmental management by its 
suppliers (Reuter et al. 2010). This can lead to adverse publicity, reputational damage and 
even costly legal obligations (Carter and Jennings 2004; Koplin et al. 2007). In order to avoid 
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being held responsible for the lack of environmental performance of their suppliers, supply 
management must ensure that their international suppliers comply with their corporate codes 
of conduct and that environmental misconduct at supplier premises does not occur (Reuter et 
al. 2010).  
A collaborative relationship between a firm and its suppliers is necessary for the 
effective implementation not only of environmental initiatives, but also for any long-term 
development of the firm’s production systems as well as supplier capabilities (Handfield et al. 
2000). For example, cooperation with suppliers can lead to effective waste reduction, 
environmental innovation, cost-effective environmental solutions, development and efficient 
adoption of new environmental technologies, and can also facilitate consumers understanding 
of the firm’s environmental performance (e.g., Geffen and Rothenberg 2000; Hall 2000; 
Veleva et al. 2003). However, the complexity, and procedures for assessing and developing 
supplier sustainability can be prohibitive, especially for small and medium enterprises 
(Perrini and Tencati 2006). There is empirical evidence, for example, that collection of 
suppliers’ environmental information does not necessarily lead to an evaluation of this data 
but stops as proxy measures in supplier selection (Koplin et al. 2007; Preuss 2007). This 
limits purchasing’s role to policing rather than integrating and developing the supplier base. 
Similarly, suppliers’ adherence to the purchasing firm’s standards does not necessarily lead 
purchasing personnel to be fully engaged in the sustainability agenda (Preuss 2007). For the 
realization of any long-term environmental performance, the role of supply management is 
crucial not only in enhancing but even in maintaining and ensuring that its suppliers, whether 
local or global, understand their roles and are committed to carrying out the firm’s 
environmental goals.  
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Distribution and Logistics Management 
The efficient collection of post-consumption materials, components, and products is 
necessary for effective environmental management in the reuse, recycle, and remanufacture 
stages. Reverse logistics ties these concepts together by incorporating reverse distribution 
with resource management and waste minimization, and involve all the activities associated 
with the collection and recovery or disposal of used resources (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001). 
The operations of reverse channels of distribution are receiving increased attention as 
rampant solid waste pollution frequent energy shortages, and serious materials scarcities are 
recognized as realities of our modern age (Jayaraman et al. 2003). In addition to being 
environmentally friendly, effective management of reverse logistic can lead to higher 
profitability by reducing costs associated with collection, transportation, inventory and 
warehousing, and categorization (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001). 
The design and management of traditional supply chains have primarily focused on 
optimizing the forward channel: procurement, production, and the distribution of products to 
end consumers (Beamon 1999). However, the environmental performance of an organization 
is also determined by the stages following product purchase and aspects of reverse operations 
often also directly impact their forward channels. For example, the efficiency in collection, 
transportation, and categorization of recollected parts can reduce the waste generated and 
facilitate subsequent recycling and remanufacturing processes. Even for initial stages of the 
forward channel, desired collection and recyclability rates influence the material selection 
criteria and the quality of recycled material is largely influenced by the way the collection 
activities, e.g., sorting, are performed (Jahre 1995). The high interdependence has led many 
firms to adopt extended, closed-loop supply chains, which simultaneously considers both 
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forward and reverse channels and includes the reuse, recycling, remanufacturing, and 
disposal processes (Beamon 1999).  
Unfortunately, reverse operations are almost never as well developed as their forward 
counterparts and often operate separately with different external parties involved. Moreover, 
although reusing and recycling materials is environmentally beneficial, unless the costs of 
operating reverse channels are offset by the financial recovery from these processes, there is 
little incentive for firms to pursue reverse logistic initiatives, leading firms to simply discard 
the reusable waste (Zsidisin and Siferd 2001). Incorporating reverse operations can only be 
effective if, the reverse logistics are efficiently managed with the collaboration and 
commitment from all entities involved. By minimizing waste generated in the reverse 
channel and ensuring effective reuse, recycle, and remanufacturing within reverse operations, 
firms can achieve both financial and environmental outcomes. 
2.4 External Carbon Management 
 External carbon management refers to approaches that have no direct impact on the 
firm’s products or operations and are aimed at (partially) compensating for the negative 
environmental externalities generated throughout the operations. Emissions can be generated 
across all stages of a firm’s business model. In particular, for many firms, the transportation 
and manufacture processes contribute substantially to the total volume of emissions. For 
multinational firms, their widespread distribution of retailers and global supply base are 
factors that intensify the environmental impact from transportation. Firms that also compete 
in manufacture-intense product categories will have high environmental impact from their 
processing stages. Unlike internal approaches previously discussed, post-manufacture carbon 
management is independent of individual operational stages, can be implemented at a gross 
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level, and does not require firms to undergo physical alterations to their products or processes, 
providing firms with a more flexible and non-disruptive approach to waste minimization. 
Carbon Market 
Among the various greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is by far the most dominant, 
accounting for around 84 percent of the total U.S. emission (EPA 2011). Accordingly, it has 
been used as the measurement unit for calculating the atmospheric impact of any economic 
activity – hence the term ‘carbon footprint’ (Carbon Trust 2007a). Carbon footprints can be 
measured for activities at the individual level as well as at an organizational level. In fact, 
online calculators now allow individuals to calculate the carbon footprint associated with 
their lifestyles such as travel and consumption. Specific to products, the product carbon 
footprint refers to the total volume of greenhouse gas emissions (measured in carbon dioxide 
equivalents) associated with the product across its entire life cycle from the extraction of raw 
material, to manufacturing, usage, and even disposal (CenSA 2007). In addition to green 
electricity, biodegradable packaging and waste, and  recycled content, investments in 
measuring and managing the product carbon footprint have given firms the right to attach a 
“carbon footprint label” to their products. For example, grocery giant Tesco has initiated 
carbon footprint labeling on several product categories including orange juice, light bulbs, 
and washing detergent (Carbon Trust 2007b). Companies including Wal-Mart, PepsiCo, and 
Coca-Cola have similar initiatives in the works.  
 On the consumer side, market research suggests that 67 percent of consumers are 
more likely to buy a product with a low carbon footprint (Gfk NOP 2006), 44 percent would 
switch to such a product even if it was not their first choice, and 43 percent would pay more 
for products that help them lower their own carbon footprint (LEK 2007). Studies also 
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indicate that consumers are willing to pay premiums of US $30 per night for hotel services 
that demonstrate superior environmental performance (Rivera 2002), spend 20 percent to 50 
percent more for organically produced food products (Barkley 2002), and pay US $3000 to 
$8000 more for hybrid cars over comparable non-hybrid cars (Walters 2005). This suggests 
that carbon footprint labels and investments in reducing product carbon footprints can act as 
important strategic variables for firms to differentiate their products in the minds of the 
consumers. 
 Over the last eight years, a worldwide market has developed for greenhouse gas 
emissions. Known as the carbon market, this market for environmental negative externalities 
has grown at a rapid speed with increases in the number of intermediaries entering the market 
(Harris 2007). The size of the carbon market has continued to increase, with the value of the 
voluntary offset market increasing from US $414 million in 2010 to $569 million in 2011 
(World Bank 2012).  
 Today, the carbon market is composed to two sectors – compliance and voluntary – 
with two types of transactions: allowance-based and project-based. In comparison to 
regulation-driven compliance markets, project-based voluntary carbon markets involve the 
voluntary ‘offsetting’ of emissions through investments in environmental projects, which are 
aimed at either preventing the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere or reducing 
and recapturing the generated emissions. To date, the compliance market is responsible for 
the majority of emission transactions. However, the voluntary offset market is contributing 
increasingly. In the year 2007, a record 65 million tons of emissions (in carbon dioxide 
equivalents) was traded in the voluntary markets, a value worth US $330 million (Hamilton 
et al. 2008) with over 150 intermediaries worldwide (Lovell et al. 2009).  
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 Just as the carbon footprint can be applied to individuals, the voluntary carbon market 
allows companies, public bodies, and individual consumers to purchase credits generated 
from their investments in environmental projects. “Offsets” can be purchased from various 
governmental or independent intermediaries, who then transfer the payments to fund these 
projects and are also responsible for their monitoring. By far the most active participants in 
the voluntary carbon markets are firms, largely offsetting their operational activities (Harris 
2007).  For firms that go as far as offsetting all of their generated emissions, they become 
‘carbon neutral,’ which is even thought to be becoming the ‘it’ commodity (Harris 2007).  
 Firms communicate their efforts to offset the emissions generated throughout their 
operations by participation in the voluntary carbon market through carbon footprint labels. 
Similar to green product labels, carbon footprint labels can inform consumers of the product 
carbon footprint level, additional efforts in the reduction of the product carbon footprint, and 
certifications from external monitoring organizations. The branding and labeling services 
offered by many intermediaries support this trend, enabling logos to be used in marketing 
material and on products (Harris 2007). However, carbon footprint labels are also susceptible 
to the same advantages and disadvantages of green product labels.  
Skepticism 
Attitudes toward the voluntary carbon market in general are mixed. On the one hand, 
offsetting can generate additional benefits by creating societal awareness through products, 
which are marketed as low-carbon or even carbon-free. In addition, a critical case for offsets 
lies in the urgency and scale of the climate change challenge (Harris 2007). Unlike 
generating social reform and a widespread change in lifestyles, carbon offsetting offers a 
means to achieve a huge volume of emission reductions quickly with the resources available 
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(Harris 2007). Furthermore, as is the nature of market mechanisms, the prices of offsetting 
will approach the marginal cost of abating at home and make more domestic reductions 
available (Harris 2007). 
On the other hand, it is argued that rather than providing a solution, carbon offsetting 
provides participants with a ‘right to pollute’ and contributes to increased corporate power 
(Carbon Trade Watch 2005) allowing firms to buy their way out of their obligations 
(Lefevere 2005). It is argued this distracts from truly effective action on climate change, and 
will not force the fundamental changes required, that will drive change in consumption 
patterns and fossil fuel use. As such, various organizations recognize a hierarchy of carbon 
management action, with the importance of internal reductions stressed (Harris 2007). 
 For example, The Carbon Trust, a non-profit organization aimed at helping firms reduce 
their emissions and become more efficient, conclude that: first, business should focus on 
reducing their own cost-effective direct emissions; second, that indirect cost-effective 
emissions up and down the supply chain should be reduce; and third, if appropriate, 
offsetting should be used (Harris 2007). 
Consumer skepticism is especially relevant in the context of carbon footprints and 
offsetting claims. Specific concerns about carbon offsetting include carbon leakage – where 
there is an increase in carbon emission in one area as a result of a reduction in another area – 
and carbon additionality – which refers to the likelihood that an emission-reducing project 
such as reforestation would have happened in the normal course, even without payments 
from offsetting. Likewise, controversies regarding the use of carbon footprint labels include 
the complexity of measuring carbon along the entire supply chain and confusion in 
interpreting the labels. These negative effects can easily overwhelm the positive sentiments 
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generated by pro-social behaviors (Folkes and Kamins 1999; Wagner et al. 2009), and can 
even generalize to other, broader evaluations of the firm (Darke and Ritchie 2007). Not 
surprisingly, studies indicate that 60 percent of consumers express doubts about carbon 
footprint claims by firms (LEK 2007), and 70 percent would value an independent 
assessment of such claims (Gfk NOP 2006). 
2.5 Summary and Discussion 
Since the 1960’s a rising interest in environmental issues and the environmental 
impacts of human economic activities including firms’ operations has led to the increase in 
the size of environmentally conscious, green consumer markets. Green consumers take 
environmental elements into consideration when making purchase and consumption 
decisions. Purchasing green products and/or from environmentally friendly firms can provide 
emotional, social, and functional value to green consumers. Although product utilitarian 
attributes are considered as more important, research provides evidence of consumers who 
are still willing to pay a price premium for products deemed environmentally friendly. More 
importantly, green consumers often consider environmental aspects as necessary, where 
greater product quality cannot fully compensate for the lack of environmental responsibility.  
Firms can implement environmentally friendly initiatives internally by altering 
aspects of products or operations to enhance efficient resource usage and minimize wastes. 
Alternatively, or in addition, firms can participate in external negative externality markets 
and trade off portions of their intangible waste streams generated throughout their operations. 
On the one hand, external approaches provide firms with a flexible and non-disruptive 
method to environmental management since it does involve making physical changes to the 
firm’s products or processes. On the other hand, external approaches are susceptible to 
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consumer skepticism for various reasons including the intangible nature of emissions, the 
external nature of the offsetting mechanism, and the perception of “paying off” the firm’s 
responsibilities.  
Environmental initiatives in terms of product design and supply chain management 
are operationally internal approaches to reducing unnecessary resources and minimizing the 
waste streams generated throughout the firm’s operations. Green design aims at incorporating 
environmental aspects at the early design phase with an understanding of the direct and 
indirect effects throughout the product’s life cycle and across the firm’s operations. These 
initiatives are focused on the flow of tangible materials and their treatments but also impact 
and are impacted by the management of operational efficiencies. In addition to the product 
level, implementation across various functions within supply chain management also affect 
firms’ environmental performances. With the increasing complexity of closed-loop supply 
chains, purchasing, manufacture, supply management, and logistics management all play 
focal roles in the realization of any long-term environmental outcome. Firms often neglect 
the importance of collaboration and communication between their operational functions and 
the maintaining of full commitment from external entities involved in developing a truly 
sustainable and competitive supply chain.  
 Externally, firms can participate in the voluntary carbon market and offset some of 
the intangible waste created across their operations. This enables firms to reduce its total 
environmental impact and the associated carbon footprint level of products without the risk 
of making tradeoffs between product quality and environmental friendliness. However, the 
carbon market is still in its early stages and is subject to various criticisms. For example, 
consumers may be uncertain of the actual effectiveness of the offset mechanism, whether the 
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transaction does indeed lead to an environmental outcome, and whether the resulting 
outcome is personally relevant. Moreover, the communication method of carbon footprint 
labels can give rise to consumer skepticism. The actual difficulty in the measurement of 
emissions at any stage may have consumers question what aspects are included and excluded 
in the carbon footprint level and how the measurements are calculated.  
  Organizations pursue green marketing strategies with the realization that an 
increasing segment of the customer base is becoming green. Unfortunately, green consumers 
are also likely to harbor anti-corporate biases and distrust advertisers (Shrum et al. 1995). 
Such skepticism arise from several issues associated with firm’s green marketing including 
false advertising, lack of common standards for evaluating environmental claims, and innate 
negative attitudes often exhibited by green consumers toward corporations (Zinkhan and 
Carlson 1995). Coupled with the active exchange in product information by green consumers, 
misleading, inaccurate, or non-defensible claims may be met with backlash whereby the 
negative perception by green consumers affects not only these consumers but also other 
consumers through negative word-of-mouth. Therefore, marketers who desire to target green 
consumers face a dilemma between the potential profitability of green consumers and their 
somewhat cynical attitudes toward green marketing activities, likeliness to discount 
advertising messages and distrust in corporate motives.  
 Companies that manage and mitigate their exposure to climate-change risks while 
seeking new opportunities for profit will generate a competitive advantage over rivals in a 
carbon-constrained future. While environmental investments are welcome by society, 
managers need to identify the circumstances favoring both public benefits and corporate 
profits. For some firms, butter utilization of resources may pay-off as environment-related 
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investments. For others, obtaining certification or having some eco-labeled products can 
eventually be the best way of pursuing competitive advantage (Orsato 2006). It is important 
for firms and mangers to understand where the possibilities for environmental improvements 
lie and, more importantly, how each approach will affect and be affected by the continuing 
increase in consumers’ environmental sentiments.  
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 2. THE PRODUCT CARBON FOOTPRINT PORTFOLIO 
3.1 Introduction 
 Increasing corporate attention is being paid to the atmospheric impact associated with 
products and firms’ operations. More than 8,500 corporations in over 135 countries have 
adopted the Global Compact aimed at making their operations more environment-friendly 
(UN Global Compact 2011), and many CEOs believe that businesses must address climate 
change (Bielak et al. 2007). Now, the atmospheric impact of any economic activity is widely 
recognized as its ‘carbon footprint.’ In particular, the product carbon footprint refers to the 
total volume of greenhouse gases associated with the product across its entire life cycle from 
the extraction of raw material, to the manufacturing process, usage, and even the disposal of 
the finished good (CenSA 2007). As such, product carbon footprint levels inform consumers 
on the total environmental impact associated with their purchase and consumption decisions.  
 In addition to green electricity, recycled content, and biodegradable packaging and 
waste, investments in the measurement and management of product carbon footprints have 
given firms the right to attach a “carbon footprint label” to their products. Indeed, many firms 
have already begun labeling their products with product carbon footprint information. For 
example grocery giant Tesco has initiated carbon footprint labeling on several product 
categories including orange juice, light bulbs, and washing detergent (Carbon Trust 2007b). 
Companies including Wal-Mart, PepsiCo, and Coca-Cola have similar initiatives in the 
works. On the consumer side, market research suggests that 67 percent of consumers are 
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more likely to buy a product with a low carbon footprint (Gfk NOP 2006), 44 percent would 
switch to such a product even if it was not their first choice, and 43 percent would pay more 
for products that help them lower their carbon footprint (LEK 2007). Increasingly, firms are 
recognizing product carbon footprints as an intangible attribute with which consumers make 
inferences on the non-experiential environmental performance of products.  
 A firm can reduce its product carbon footprint in multiple ways. First, the firm can 
invest in technologies that neutralize or “scrub” emissions generated during the production 
stage. For example, a firm can force smokestack exhaust to pass through soda lime or a water 
spray to recapture some of the emissions. Second, the firm can lower the level of emissions 
created at source by investing in modern, fuel-efficient machinery. Third, with no additional 
investment, the firm can reduce emissions by lowering the amount of manufacturing and 
processing a product is subject to. However, this can result in a product with a less appealing 
finish and, from the consumer’s perspective, in a product of lower real or perceived quality. 
Finally, the firm can also offset some of its emissions in the carbon market. Carbon offsets 
can be purchased from governmental or certified independent intermediaries who then then 
employ the offset payments to support environmental projects, which are aimed at either 
preventing the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere or reducing/recapturing the 
generated emissions such as alternative energy development and forest expansion.  
 It can be prohibitively costly and technologically daunting for firms of substantial 
sizes to reduce their product carbon footprints to zero at source or at the smokestack. In 
contrast, participating in the voluntary carbon offset market does not directly impact firms’ 
operations and offers a flexible, non-disruptive approach to environmental management. Not 
surprisingly, the voluntary carbon offset market has been increasing continuously over the 
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past few years with over 150 intermediaries worldwide (Lovell et al. 2009). The total volume 
of greenhouse gas emission offset in the carbon market in the year 2007 alone amounted to 
65million tons (measured in carbon dioxide equivalents), a value worth US $330 million 
(Hamilton et al. 2008). 
 Despite the growth in the carbon market and the flexibility with which firms can take 
advantage of carbon offsets to manage their product carbon footprints, both carbon footprint 
information and carbon offsetting activities are susceptible to consumer skepticism. For 
example, specific concerns about carbon offsetting include carbon leakage – where there is 
an increase in emission in one area as a result of a reduction in another area – and carbon 
additionality – which refers to the likelihood that an emission-reducing project such as 
reforestation would have happened in the normal course, even without payments from 
offsetting. Likewise, controversies regarding the use of product carbon footprint labels 
include the complexity of measuring emissions along the entire supply chain and confusion 
in interpreting the labels. Not surprisingly, studies indicate that 60 percent of consumers 
express doubts about carbon footprint claims by firms (LEK 2007), and 70 percent would 
value an independent assessment of such claims (Gfk NOP 2006). These negative effects can 
easily overwhelm the positive sentiments generated by pro-social behaviors (Folkes and 
Kamins 1999; Wagner et al. 2009), and can even generalize to broader evaluations of the 
firm (Darke and Ritchie 2007).  
 With this in mind, the objective of this essay is to understand how a firm, faced with a 
market where consumers differentially value the firm’s environmental management schemes, 
can strategically manage a portfolio of product carbon footprint-reducing initiatives. An 
empirical investigation is first conducted to further understand consumer perceptions of 
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distinct environmental approaches. Findings from the empirical study are then incorporated 
into a theoretical model of a monopolistic firm’s decisions regarding operationally internal 
and external product carbon footprint-reducing initiatives. 
Related Literature and Contribution 
 Research on the implications of green product offerings have typically adopted a 
traditional product differentiation model, with firms choosing a level of “green” product 
quality and then pricing the product (e.g., Amacher et al. 2004; Arora and Gangopadhyay 
1995; Conrad 2005). In particular, a large fraction of the research on “green” specifically in 
terms of atmospheric greenhouse gases and emission reduction is found in the economic 
resource management literature. While some studies do consider the market implications of 
emission-managing initiatives, most are focused on the impact of policy and regulations on 
competition, the environment, and social welfare. Whereas a detailed review is beyond the 
scope of this essay, some of the issues studied include: voluntary (over)compliance (Arora 
and Gangopadhyay 1995), commodity tax effects (Cremer and Thisse 1999), allocation of 
emission permits (Ahlheim and Schneider 2002), minimum unit emission standard (Moraga-
Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero 2002), and subsidy/tax policies (Bansal and Gangopadhyay 
2003). In addition, the majority of this research assumes that the entire population of 
consumers is environmentally concerned at least to some extent. When market segmentation 
approaches are employed, two types of consumers are typically considered: environmentally 
concerned consumers – those who respond to all corporate green initiatives in a similar 
manner – and traditional consumers – those who are not influenced by green initiatives (e.g., 
Besley and Ghatak 2007; Rodriguez-Ibeas 2007).  
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 Against this backdrop, this essay offers the following contributions. First, previous 
models typically capture emission management with a single variable. Stated differently, 
researchers have adopted a ‘does or does not’ view to reducing emissions rather than a more 
detailed ‘which part and by how much’ perspective.  Likewise, existing research does not 
differentiate consumers in terms of how they evaluate distinct environmental approaches. 
Knowledge about consumer heterogeneity is important in this context because it can inform 
the firm’s design of an ideal portfolio of green initiatives. For example, a firm can reduce its 
product carbon footprint by lowering the level of processing, neutralizing some of its initial 
emission, or offsetting some of the emission in the carbon market. The firm’s overall green 
strategy must reflect whether and how consumers differentially value each approach. This 
essay empirically investigates this issue and incorporates such differences into a theoretical 
model of a firm’s product carbon footprint-reducing strategy.  
 Second, previous research has not considered some important dependencies between 
tangible product characteristics and intangible environmental aspects. For example, reducing 
the degree of product processing lowers the associated level of emission, but can also impair 
product quality. Market research suggests that as many as 41 percent of consumers would not 
purchase green products if they were of lower quality (Ginsberg and Bloom 2004). In fact, 
regardless of the actual nature of the relationship, consumers have been found to make 
inherent tradeoffs between environmental attributes and their perceptions of a product’s 
functional performance – i.e., consumers may assume green products to be of lower quality 
(Chen 2001; Luchs et al. 2007). This essay jointly addresses the issues of heterogeneity in 
consumer valuation for environmental attributes as well as a direct relationship between 
emission-reducing initiatives and product quality. 
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 Third, carbon offsetting is rapidly emerging as a minimally disruptive mechanism that 
firms can employ to manage their greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, carbon footprint 
labels provide firms with a way to directly communicate their carbon offsetting efforts to the 
end consumer. To the author’s knowledge, no research has examined how firms faced with 
consumers that differentially evaluate alternative approaches to reducing the product carbon 
footprint must ideally employ this mechanism. This essay sheds light on this issue by 
analyzing a theoretical model of a monopolist embedded in a market with consumers who 
have heterogeneous preferences for distinct corporate green initiatives.  
 The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. The next section describes an 
exploratory empirical investigation of how consumers differentially value distinct product 
carbon footprint-reducing initiatives. The study distinguishes between (1) internal approaches 
that are directly related to a firm’s manufacturing process and (2) external methods that are 
independent of the firm’s operations. Building on the insights that emerge, a theoretical 
model is then presented of a monopolist who serves a market where consumers differentially 
value alternative emission-reducing approaches. Key findings are discussed on decisions 
regarding product processing and quality, internal and external emission-reducing efforts, 
and their implications for firm profits, the product carbon footprint, and aggregate emission.  
3.2 Empirical Investigation 
Design and Method 
 A total of 186 undergraduate students (57.8% male) in a large U.S. university 
participated in the study for partial course credit. The study focused on willingness-to-pay 
(WTP) for a single product for which the participants comprised a key target segment in real 
life – a hooded sweatshirt. The study employed a 2 (method of emission reduction) × 3 (level 
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of emission reduction) within-subject questionnaire and was conducted online using the 
Qualtrics software platform in a computer lab setting. A within-subject design was used to 
track variations in WTP across different emission reduction levels and the method of 
reduction was presented in random order to account for order effects – none were found.  
 The methods of reducing the product carbon footprint level used were: technology 
investments and carbon offsetting. Because of its direct association with the manufacturing 
process, technology investments were used to represent an operationally internal method of 
reducing the product carbon footprint. On the other hand, carbon offsetting is independent of 
the product and its production process and was therefore used to represent an operationally 
external method of emission reduction. To ensure consequential responses, the study 
involved a Vickrey auction – a second price sealed bid auction where the highest bidder wins 
but pays the second highest bid (Vickrey 1961). Widely applied in WTP studies, this 
demand-revealing auction has been shown to effectively reveal true WTP (Kagel and Levin 
1993; Noussair et al. 2004). To ensure participant understanding of the Vickrey auction, a 
description of the auction was presented followed by a verification question – only the data 
from correct responses was analyzed.  
 In the study, participants were first asked to indicate their initial bids (WTP measures) 
for the product.
1
 Participants were then presented with information about the definition and 
use of carbon footprint labels and were asked for their bids for the same product with its 
carbon footprint level (70lb) revealed as in Figure 1 – this was used as the base product in 
subsequent analyses.
2
 Two independent sets of questions were then presented in random 
                                                 
1
 An illustration of the product along with some general features was provided for all questions – these 
remained consistent throughout and only the manipulation factors were altered accordingly. 
 
2
 Level of carbon footprint was based on industry reports of products in a similar category. 
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order – one manipulating the level of product carbon footprint reduction by internal methods 
(technology investments) and another manipulating the level of emission reduction by 
external methods (carbon offsetting). At the beginning of each set, a description of how the 
approach is able to reduce the product’s carbon footprint was provided and bids were 
obtained for three emission reduction levels (20%, 40%, and 60%) for both the internal and 
external emission-reduction conditions.
3
 Specifically, internal emission reduction was 
described as follows:  
 “To reduce the environmental impact associated with its products, the Apparel 
Company is considering potential investments in efficient technologies. Each 
investment alternative will result in a different level of carbon footprint associated 
with its products.” 
 
For external emission reduction, the carbon offsetting mechanism and the fact that, under 
carbon offsetting, the company does not reduce the amount of atmospheric emissions but 
instead compensates for some of the emissions through investments in other green initiatives 
was clarified. A verification question was then asked to check participants’ understanding. 
Following the verification question, external emission reduction was described as follows: 
 “If the Apparel Company decides to participate in carbon offsetting, there are 
several environmental projects toward which the Apparel Company can transfer its 
carbon offsetting payments. For example, the Apparel Company can choose to 
transfer its payment to projects involving forestation, wind energy, and hydroelectric 
power. Regardless of the type or scale of the project, the amount of carbon emission 
that is absorbed (or prevented) depends on the amount of carbon that the Apparel 
Company decides to offset. 
With different levels of participation in carbon offsetting, the net carbon footprint 
associated with each of the Apparel Company's products can be reduced.” 
 
 Finally, participants responded to the following control scales: category involvement, 
perception of corporate claim believability (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001), socially responsible 
                                                 
3
 The chosen reduction levels reflect achievable and practiced levels for products in similar categories. 
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behavior (Webb et al. 2008), and perceived consumer effectiveness (Straughan and Roberts 
1999).  
Results 
 Participants who did not understand the Vickrey auction or the carbon offsetting 
mechanism were removed from the analyses, resulting in 172 (92.47%) usable responses. 
With respect to the effect of product carbon footprint labels, no significant difference was 
found in respondents’ WTP measures before and after revealing the product’s environmental 
impact (Mbefore = $20.31, Mafter = $20.17; t (171) = – .14, p > .1). Thus, the added factual 
information regarding the baseline product carbon footprint level did not influence the 
valuation of the product (see Table 1 for a tabulation of the findings). 
 Type of Initiative. Participants showed systematic differences in their response 
toward the two distinct methods of emission reduction. 60.4 percent of participants increased 
their WTP measures for both internal and external methods across the three reduction levels 
– these participants valued both approaches to lowering the product carbon footprint. On the 
other hand, 10.5 percent of participants increased their WTP measures for internal efforts, but 
were nonchalant or skeptical toward external carbon offset efforts – their WTP measures did 
not change or became even lower across the three reduction levels. These results provide 
support that, even if the net reduction in the environmental impact of the product is the same, 
consumers may differentially value the method through which the reduction is made.   
 To understand the possible drivers of this difference, self-reported measures on 
category involvement, socially responsible consumption behavior, corporate claim 
believability, and perceived consumer effectiveness were compared between participants 
who valued both approaches to emission reduction (“receptive”) and participants who only 
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valued internal methods and were skeptical toward external approaches (“skeptic”). No 
significant difference was found between the two participant types across the above scales 
(see Table 1). These findings imply that differences in consumer response to the type of 
green initiative are not culminations of greater environmental concern and/or involvement in 
environmentally conscious behavior – neither type of consumer can be said to be ‘greener’ 
than the other. 
 Overall, no significant difference was found between internal and external carbon 
footprint-reducing methods in the average valuation for an additional 20 percent emission 
reduction (Minternal = $1.85, Mexternal = $2.23; t(171) = – 1.36, p > .1).
4
 Within “receptive” 
participants, changes in their WTP measures for an additional 20 percent emission reduction 
was marginally greater for reductions made through external carbon offsets than technology 
investments (Minternal = $2.90, Mexternal = $3.48; t(103) = – 1.92, p = .058). Although this 
suggest a greater valuation for carbon offsets than internal approaches, the relative 
unfamiliarity with carbon offsetting, the detailed explanation of the mechanism provided, and 
frequent mention of the product carbon footprint may also have contributed to these results.   
 Carbon Footprint Expectation. More importantly, individual expectations of the 
appropriate product carbon footprint level differed across respondents (see Figure 2). For 
example, among the respondents who valued internal efforts, only 60 percent increased their 
WTP measures for all three levels of emission reduction. On the other hand, 40 percent only 
increased their WTP measures for higher levels of emission reduction from the baseline (40% 
and 60%). A similar pattern was found for respondents who valued carbon offsets. These 
findings suggest that there exists a threshold of appreciation for green initiatives. Consumers 
                                                 
4
 The average change in WTP measures across the three emission reduction levels was used in the comparison.  
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may be willing to pay a price premium for emission reduction efforts, but only if the firm 
exceeds their thresholds in terms of the degree of emission reduction. 
The above empirical investigation reveals some key insights that are relevant for the 
following theoretical model. First, traditional approaches which dichotomize the market into 
“green” and “non-green” segments can be restrictive since they cannot distinguish between 
consumers who value some types of environmental approaches but not all. By generalizing 
consumers who respond to one environmental approach as “green,” firms can overestimate 
the value of other initiatives since not all of these consumers may respond in the same way. 
Second, consumer evaluations of a firm’s emission-reducing approach may be subject to a 
threshold effect – even if consumers are appreciative of firms’ efforts to reduce their product 
carbon footprint, they may only be willing to pay a price premium for reduction levels that, 
in their minds, reflect a significant effort on the part of the firm. Finally, consumers may 
differentially evaluate different types of emission-reducing initiatives even when they 
ultimately reflect the same level of reduction. Building on these insights, a theoretical model 
is next presented regarding a monopolist’s decisions related to (1) the degree of product 
processing (which impact both product quality and the level of product carbon footprint), (2) 
internal and external carbon footprint reduction efforts, and (3) price.  
3.3 Theoretical Model 
Consumer Utility 
 A consumer’s total utility from each product unit comprises the utility derived from 
the product’s tangible characteristics (or “quality”), intangible characteristics (emission-
related attributes), and price. Consistent with the empirical study, two distinct emission-
related attributes are considered: (1) initial emission – the product’s baseline carbon footprint 
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level, a direct consequence of the product manufacturing process – and (2) carbon offsetting. 
The product manufacturing process affects both product quality and the initial emission level 
of the product. Specifically, intensive processing yields a higher quality product but also 
results in greater emissions. This imposes a trade-off for consumers between a private good 
(quality) and a public good (clean air).  
 As demonstrated in the empirical section, consumers have different expectations for a 
product’s carbon footprint level based on their expectations of how the firm should manage 
its environmental impact. As such, consumers only value environmental efforts that, in their 
minds, exceed these thresholds and are able to lower the product carbon footprint below their 
expectations. Consumer expectation of the firm’s environmental efforts and the resulting 
product carbon footprint is captured in their “tolerance” levels, where the consumer allocates 
a higher (lower) utility for the product if it is associated a lower (higher) carbon footprint 
level than their tolerance level. Consumers are distributed uniformly along the interval [0,1], 
representing heterogeneous tolerance levels. 
 In addition to differences in tolerance levels, two distinct consumer segments are 
considered – Receptive Consumers and Skeptic Consumers – that differ in their response to 
the firm’s carbon offset claims. Receptive consumers value the firm’s carbon offset claims 
and are willing to reward the firm for efforts to reduce the environmental impact through 
carbon offsetting. Conversely, skeptic consumers are only concerned about the direct 
environmental impacts from the firm’s operations – external carbon offset claims do not 
influence these consumers. In sum, the theoretical model assumes that all consumers are 
environmentally concerned at least to some extent in the sense that, all else being equal, all 
consumers prefer products with a lower environmental impact. At the same time, the model 
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recognizes that consumers may be sensitive toward the approach taken by the firm to make 
its product more environment-friendly. Whereas the source of skeptic consumers’ resistance 
to carbon offsetting is not relevant to the model, possible motivations include (1) disbelief in 
the actual occurrence of effective offsetting despite certification from monitoring bodies and 
(2) questioning of the personal relevance of those initiatives. Consumers purchase a 
maximum of one product unit and Table 2 summarizes all notations used hereafter.   
 The utility (U) for a purchasing consumer with a tolerance level of θ is expressed as: 
                          (1) 
        {
                              
                                 
 
and     {
       for Receptive Consumers
       for Skeptic Consumers     
 
 The first term ‘  ’ indicates the utility from tangible characteristics, namely product 
quality. From a consumer’s perspective, product quality comprises two distinct components: 
input quality and quality from processing. Input quality refers to the quality of raw materials 
and is independent of the manufacturing process. As the focus of this essay is specific to 
product manufacturing and the associated environmental impact, input quality is suppressed 
and only the process-related dimensions of product quality are considered.
5
 For every unit 
increase in processing ( ), product quality increases proportionally by   (i.e., total product 
quality increases by   ). Valuation for product quality is assumed equal across consumers – 
this simplifying assumption helps keep the focus on emission management decisions.  
 The second term ‘             ’ reflects the change in product valuation from 
intangible environmental attributes, namely, emissions. Here,    indicates the level of initial 
                                                 
5
 An additional model specification with input quality as a decision variable and a corresponding, quadratic cost 
term was also analyzed. The findings did not differ considerably from the model. 
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emission (initial product carbon footprint) associated with the product (a direct result of 
processing), where   is the amount of emission generated per unit of processing. Firms with a 
lower   have a lower environmental impact associated with their operations, reflecting a 
“cleaner” technology.     indicates the amount of the initial emission that is offset and   is 
the valuation weight for carbon offsets relative to initial emission. It follows that        
is the net product carbon footprint and          is the difference between the product’s 
net emission and the consumer’s tolerance level. Relative to product quality, the valuation 
weight which consumers allocate to intangible aspects is captured by the environmental 
concern parameter (  ), where a higher    implies a greater impact of emission on overall 
product valuation. Individual differences in valuation toward net emission are captured in 
their tolerance levels – therefore, the environmental concern parameter can be interpreted as 
reflecting the average environmental sensitivity of each consumer segment. The experimental 
results support a single parameter (a common  ) – however, a more flexible segment-wise 
specification is used in the model.  
 To summarize, the change in product valuation from emission-related aspects for a 
receptive consumer with a tolerance level of   is              . On the other hand, 
because skeptic consumers do not value to the firm’s external carbon offsetting efforts, these 
consumers are only affected by the deviation of the product’s initial emission level from their 
tolerance level and the resulting effect on product valuation is         . More importantly, 
since consumers are differentiated in their tolerance levels, the effect of the environmental 
attributes on product valuation is not necessarily negative. For example, consumers with 
tolerance levels lower than the product’s initial emission (i.e.,     ) will associate a 
negative utility with the product’s initial carbon footprint. However, for receptive consumers, 
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if the firm engages in carbon offsetting such that the product’s net emission becomes lower 
than the consumer’s tolerance level (i.e.,          ), then the net effect of emission-
related aspects on product valuation can be changed from negative to positive. Consistent 
with the empirical findings, this utility specification captures the willingness of consumers 
who value a firm’s green initiatives, but not necessarily at every level of effort.    
Firm Profits 
 Consumers purchase one unit of the product if the utility from purchasing is greater 
than the price. The fraction of receptive and skeptic consumers within the total market is 
denoted   and  , respectively. Taken together, the monopolist faces a market demand of (see 
A1in the Appendix A for details):        
       (
                   
  
)   (
             
  
)   (2) 
 Increased processing improves product quality but also increases the initial product 
carbon footprint level. For example, leather undergoes several stages of processing before 
being transformed into a product. The more the cuts of leather are refined and polished, the 
finer is the ultimate product. However, these choices can lead to increased electricity, 
chemical, and machinery usage, each of which can directly or indirectly contribute to higher 
emissions. In the model, processing is represented by . Product quality and initial product 
carbon footprint are increasing in processing by factors of   and  , respectively. A high   
indicates the firm’s ability to increase product quality with limited increases in processing. A 
high  , on the other hand, reflects the use of a “dirty” technology and indicates the firms’ 
inability to manufacture products at a small carbon footprint per unit of processing. 
Correspondingly,   is termed as the firm’s “quality efficiency” and   as the firm’s “process 
inefficiency.” 
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 Marginal cost of production is assumed to be quadratic in processing and is expressed 
as     where   is the associated production cost parameter. Because quality is linear in 
processing, this setup captures the standard assumption where marginal cost is quadratic in 
quality. All consumers appreciate higher quality, which can be obtained with additional 
processing. At the same time, consumers dislike emissions. However, consumers with high 
tolerance levels may perceive a product with a relatively high product carbon footprint level 
as still being environmentally friendly (i.e.,           may still be positive).    
 In addition to production costs, the cost of offsetting is assumed to be quadratic in the 
amount of emission offset per product and linear in the total quantity produced. The 
quadratic specification captures the increasing cost of overcoming consumer skepticism and 
credibly convincing consumers of carbon offsetting efforts especially at higher levels of 
offsets. As argued earlier, consumer resistance to carbon offsets can derive from a disbelief 
of the truthfulness of the offset mechanism, questions about the personal relevance of offsets, 
and/or the expectation that the firm should focus more on reducing emissions internally at 
source within their operations. On the other hand, carbon offset markets are reasonably liquid 
– the linear specification captures a fixed per-unit cost of offsets. In sum, the total cost of 
carbon offsetting is expressed as         where   is the fraction of emission offset per 
product (recall that    refers to the initial emission level from the processing of a product 
unit and   is the total number of products produced) and  is an integrated cost parameter 
which captures both offsetting and offsetting communication costs. 
 Accordingly, the firm’s profit function comprises two terms, the traditional price 
minus marginal cost term and a second carbon offsetting cost term. Note that in this profit 
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function, the carbon offsetting decision also affects the first term through its impact on 
demand: 
            –        –             (3) 
 The firm faces three decisions. First, the firm decides on the initial level of processing 
which determines product quality and initial product carbon footprint. Then the firm decides 
on the fraction of the product’s initial carbon footprint to offset. Finally, the firm decides on 
price. The model is solved using three-stage backward induction.  
3.4 Findings and Discussion 
 Closed form solutions to the profit maximizing decisions regarding processing (  ), 
fraction of emission offset per product (  ), and price (  ) were obtained (see A2 in the 
Appendix A for details). A general condition required for positive processing is sufficient 
quality efficiency. Specifically, as long as the quality created per unit of processing is greater 
than the associated increase in the level of emission (   ), the firm has an incentive to 
engage in production.
6
 Assuming positive production, all outcomes are of the proper signs.
7
  
 Comparative statics related to the outcomes of interest are described in Table 3. As 
expected, the degree of processing (  ) increases with quality efficiency ( ) and decreases 
with consumer environmental concern (     ) and process inefficiency ( ). In other words, if 
a unit increase in processing leads to a considerable increase in product quality then the firm 
processes more to produce a higher quality product that all consumers value. On the other 
hand, greater process inefficiency or environmental concern increases the negative impact of 
emission on consumer valuation for the product, resulting in less processing by the firm. 
                                                 
6
 The formal condition for production is                       . The upper bound for the right hand 
side is  . Therefore,     is used as an intuitive yet rigorous and sufficient condition for production. 
 
7
 The condition required for the fraction of carbon offset to be constrained between 0 and 1is         
  (                     ). All partial derivative interpretations are assessed under these conditions. 
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 The fraction of emission offset per product (  ) is increasing in the proportion of 
receptive consumers ( ) and their valuation for carbon offsets ( ), and decreasing in the 
proportion of skeptic consumers ( ) and the cost of offsetting ( ). Interestingly, if skeptic 
consumers’ environmental concern (  ) increases, the firm engages more in carbon offsetting. 
Given a sufficient market proportion of skeptic consumers, the positive effect of their 
environmental concern on the fraction of emission offset dominates the negative effect from 
the presence of these consumers. In other words, given a large number of skeptic consumers, 
increases in their environmental sensitivity makes it even more important for the firm to 
appeal to the receptive consumers by engaging in greater carbon offsets. Counter to our 
expectations, therefore, the presence of skeptic consumers – who do not credit the firm for 
offsetting efforts – does not necessarily restrict the firm from engaging in this initiative.  
 The findings reveal how the firm can balance constraints in some areas of the value 
addition process by focusing more intensively on other dimensions that are now relevant in 
environmentally sensitive markets. For example, in a traditional market setting, as the cost of 
processing increases, the firm lowers the level of processing and produces products of lower 
quality. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 3, processing (  ) does decrease in the production 
cost parameter ( ). However, to maintain product attractiveness, the fraction of emission 
offset per product increases in  , so that the net product carbon footprint is reduced.   
 With respect to price and firm profits, increases in quality efficiency and receptive 
consumers’ valuation for carbon offsets increase both price and firm profits while all cost 
associated parameters (   ) and process inefficiency ( ) decrease price and firm profits. On 
the other hand, the implications of segment sizes and the degree of their corresponding 
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environmental concern for price and profits are not determinate. Selected findings of interest 
are discussed next. 
 Finding 1. An increase in quality efficiency ( ) leads to an increase in processing 
(  ), a decrease in the fraction of emission offset per product (  ), an increase in firm profits 
(  ), and an increase in net emission both at the unit product level (         ) and in the 
aggregate (          ) (see A3 in the Appendix A for details). 
  
   
  
    
   
  
    
   
  
    
          
  
    
           
  
    (4) 
 Improved quality efficiency in itself benefits the firm across the entire market because 
all consumers value higher product quality. Moreover, if higher quality can be achieved for a 
given level of processing, the firm has an incentive to take advantage of the high quality 
efficiency and further increase processing. As a result, greater quality efficiency increases 
market demand and the product’s contribution margin, both of which increase firm profits. 
Even though higher quality efficiency induces greater initial product carbon footprint through 
its effect on processing, without a change in the composition of the market and/or consumers’ 
sensitivity toward emission-related aspects, altering the amount of emission offset per 
product leads to a sub-optimal outcome for the profit-maximizing firm. Therefore, to balance 
out the increase in processing, the firm reduces the fraction of emission offset per product, 
leaving the absolute amount of emission offset per product (   ) unchanged. Ultimately, this 
leads to a higher net emission per product, an effect that is further magnified at an aggregate 
level on account of an increase in demand for the higher quality product. 
 This reveals an interesting trade-off between internal operational efficiencies of the 
firm and environmental goals. At first sight, the ability to do more with less – which 
constitutes a traditional focus of many process improvement and reengineering efforts – 
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appears to be an entirely positive outcome. In fact, these efficiencies do enhance firm profits. 
However, as demonstrated, they can hurt the environment because the firm may optimally 
leverage them to increase the level of processing in the pursuit of higher quality and profits.\ 
This leads to higher unit and total carbon footprint levels, revealing a subtle “dark side” to 
internal efficiency improvements from an environmental perspective.  
 Finding 2. An increase in process inefficiency (τ) leads to a decrease in processing 
(  ) and firm profits (  ), but can increase or decrease initial emission (   ), the fraction of 
emission offset per product (  ), and net emission both at the unit product level  
(         ) and in the aggregate (          ) (see A3 in the Appendix A for details). 
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 As expected, as the manufacturing operations become ‘dirtier,’ the firm processes less 
to mitigate the negative impact of emission on consumers’ utility. However, this also impacts 
product quality, ultimately leading to a decrease in both total demand ( ) and the product’s 
contribution margin. As such, firm profits decrease with process inefficiency.  
 With respect to environmental outcomes, if quality efficiency ( ) is sufficiently high 
and/or process inefficiency ( ) is low, then Case 1 holds. Here, high quality efficiency 
provides the firm with an incentive to maintain a certain level of processing and avoid greatly 
sacrificing product quality. As a result, the reduction in processing is not substantial, and on 
balance, the initial product carbon footprint level increases. Similar to Finding 1, changes in 
process inefficiency alone do not provide the firm with an incentive to alter the amount of 
emission offset per product (   ). Therefore, in response to the increased initial emission, 
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the firm lowers the fraction of emission offset per product, keeping the absolute amount of 
emission offset per product unchanged. Subsequently, the product’s net carbon footprint 
increases, and depending on the magnitudes of the increase in net emission and decrease in 
total demand, aggregate level net emission can either increase or decrease with process 
inefficiency. For example, if the negative effect of demand outweighs the increase in initial 
emission, net total emission will decrease. In sum, under Case 1, an increase in process 
inefficiency invariably hurts the firm and leads to a less ‘green’ product, but may or may not 
benefit the environment in the aggregate. 
 On the other hand, if quality efficiency is relatively low and/or process inefficiency is 
high, then Case 2 holds. Here, the decrease in product quality from reduced processing is less 
pronounced than in Case 1. Therefore, the firm can lower processing sharply and focus on 
reducing the negative effect of emission on product valuation across all consumers. In fact, 
even though an increase in process inefficiency itself raises the level of initial product carbon 
footprint, the overall initial emission of the product decreases as a result of the greater 
reduction in processing. Similar to Case 1, the firm has no additional incentive to alter the 
absolute amount of emission offset per product. Therefore, in response to the decrease in 
initial emission, the firm increases the fraction of emission offset per product and keeps the 
absolute amount of emission offset per product unchanged. Contrary to Case 1, this leads to a 
product with a lower level of net emission. Not only is the resulting product more ‘green’ but, 
when combined with the negative effect on demand, the total negative environmental impact 
is reduced. Thus, under Case 2, increased process inefficiency invariably hurts the firm’s 
profits, but leads to a greener product and benefits the environment in the aggregate. 
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 This finding reveals a nuanced impact of an increase in process inefficiency for firm 
profits and the environment. Higher process inefficiency should ostensibly have a negative 
effect on the environment. However, as demonstrated, under situations where such an 
increase in process inefficiency is accompanied by a relatively low level of quality efficiency, 
both product-level and aggregate emission can decrease. Dirtier technologies can yield 
greener outcomes, leading to what may be termed the “dirty=green” paradox.   
 Finding 3. An increase in environmental concern (  , j=r,s) leads to a decrease in 
processing (  ), an increase in the fraction of emission offset per product (  ) and the 
amount of emission offset per product (    ), and can lead to an increase or a decrease in 
total net emission (          ) (see A3 in the Appendix A for details). 
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 Regardless of the consumer segment, increased environmental concern yields greener 
outcomes at the unit product level both before and after the firms engages in external carbon 
offsetting –these outcomes, in themselves, are not surprising. When consumers become more 
sensitive to environmental attributes, the firm lowers the net emission associated with its 
product by reducing processing and also engaging in heavier carbon offsets. Interestingly, the 
firm increases both the fraction of emission offset per product and also the total amount of 
emission offset per product even when it is the environmental concern of skeptic consumers 
– who do not value offsetting – that increases.  While it is natural for the firm to increase the 
amount of emission offset per product with a rise in receptive consumers’ environmental 
concern, it is less obvious why the firm would respond in the same fashion to an increase in 
the skeptic consumers’ concern. Intuitively, the reduction in processing on account of the 
greater environmental concern on the part of skeptic consumers leads to lower quality – this 
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makes the product less attractive to the receptive consumers as well. However, the firm can 
compensate for this reduction in attractiveness by increasing carbon offsets – which receptive 
consumers appreciate.  
 If the firm can address changes in consumers’ environmental concern appropriately, 
then total demand and profits can even increase with environmental concern – a silver lining 
for firms that are concerned about the cost-related implications of becoming green. However, 
under some circumstances, the increase in aggregate emission on account of the 
correspondingly higher production volume can outweigh the effects of the decrease in net 
emission per product, yielding higher total net emission. At first glance, it appears natural to 
reason that an increase in environment concern on the part of consumers should ultimately 
result in a greener outcome. However, as demonstrated, what is green for the individual 
consumer may not be green at the societal level. The finding has an important policy 
implication. As discussed earlier, many emerging corporate green initiatives focus on 
product-level labeling of carbon reduction strategies. However, as demonstrated, a firm may 
reduce per-product net emission, but at the same time, increase net emission at a societal 
level. Ideally, consumers must be advised to monitor both product and aggregate emissions, 
and firms should provide information related to both emission levels.    
3.5  Conclusion 
 The above analysis extends existing research on green markets in multiple directions. 
First, the model incorporates carbon offsetting as a decision variable within a firm’s green 
strategy and investigate both internal and external emission-reducing initiatives. On the 
market side, this model incorporates differences in consumer responses to carbon offsetting 
as well as variations in individual tolerance levels for emission. The findings yield insights 
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into how the presence of receptive and skeptic consumers and parameters related to quality 
efficiency, process inefficiency, and carbon offsetting impact a range of outcomes related to 
product quality, initial and net emission, carbon offset levels, and firm profits (see Table 3). 
This integrated approach allows carbon footprint reduction and related green initiatives to be 
framed not just as afterthoughts but as integral components of a profit-maximizing firm’s 
marketing strategy. 
 Managerially, the analysis brings attention to a potential dark side of operational 
improvements in quality efficiency – the quality generated for each unit of processing. While 
such improvements can enhance profits, they can also lead to negative environmental 
outcomes. Managers who are interested in protecting the environment should carefully 
consider the environmental consequences of any improvements in their operations – 
sometimes appearances can be deceptive. Also, the findings demonstrate that an increase in 
environmental concern on the part of consumers can lead to greener products but also lead to 
greater total emission on account of higher demand. Accordingly, managers must ideally 
move beyond communicating product-level carbon footprints and also disclose aggregate, 
firm-level environmental outcomes.  
 From a research perspective, the above model presents a fine-grained model of the 
elements that influence, and the outcomes that are influenced by, a firm’s green initiatives. 
Piecemeal approaches can overlook some important interdependencies between the firm’s 
production- and market-related decisions. For example, improving quality efficiency appears 
to be a laudable objective with no objectionable downside. But, as demonstrated, such an 
improvement can hurt the environment. Research that focuses on smaller components of the 
firm’s green strategy can provide valuable insights. However, those insights must be 
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evaluated within the context of a more comprehensive model for their implications to be fully 
revealed. On the demand side, consumer differences not only in the valuation for the type of 
green initiative but also in tolerance levels for emission are incorporated. This enables a 
detailed examination of how the firm’s decisions are impacted by the presence of different 
consumer segments, their predisposition toward distinct emission-reducing initiatives, and 
their tolerance for product carbon footprint levels. Research that ignores these differences 
will likely misstate the impact of specific green initiatives. 
 The above analysis is not without limitations. First, the general framework can be 
broadly applied, but additional research may be required to parameterize the framework for 
specific industries. Second, the analysis is the first step that demarcates the interdependencies 
involved in designing a portfolio of product carbon footprint-reducing initiatives. Future 
work can examine how these initiatives should be crafted in a competitive environment. 
Third, the empirical findings can be verified in other consumer and product settings.  Fourth, 
the model integrates several influences related to firm decision-making in a green setting. 
Despite the many moving parts, a compact and closed form solution for the outcomes of 
interest is derived. Future work can focus on establishing some of the findings more 
generally. Finally, the model allowed the monopolist to offer just one product – future 
research could consider product line design issues.   
  
CHAPTER 4 
ESSAY 3. IMPLICATIONS OF THE VOLUNTARY CARBON MARKET IN A 
COMPETITIVE CONTEXT 
4.1  Introduction 
Firms make increasing efforts to improve and market the environmental performance 
of their products and operations in order to contribute to environmental protection and, more 
importantly, to be perceived as environmentally responsible, capture consumer willingness to 
pay, and increase profits. However, many environment-friendly products are similar to their 
conventional versions except that they have a lower impact on the environment and are often 
priced higher. Nevertheless, some consumers still derive utility from purchasing products 
that are perceived as “clean” – e.g., manufactured with environmentally friendly methods or 
abatement technologies such as recycling and the use of less polluting inputs (Amacher et al. 
2004). Even though these aspects may not provide consumers with a tangible utilitarian 
benefit, consumers are still willing to pay more for products produced under environmentally 
friendly processes (e.g., Cason and Gagadharan 2002; Moon et al. 2002). 
Not surprisingly, increasing corporate attention is being paid to reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions and making operations more ‘green.’ More than 8,500 corporations in over 
135 countries have already adopted the Global Compact aimed at making their operations 
more environmentally responsible (UN Global Compact 2011), and many CEOs believe that 
businesses must address climate change (Bielak et al. 2007). Firms have introduced various 
environmentally friendly offerings such as green electricity, sustainably harvested produce, 
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and low-emission vehicles, and more than 40,000 products produced by over 2,400 U.S. 
manufacturers have been labeled with Energy Star, indicating their energy efficiency (Energy 
Star 2008). These initiatives are now viewed as key drivers of financial performance (Luo 
and Bhattacharya 2006).   
Carbon Market 
Carbon dioxide is by far the most dominant of the greenhouse gases and accounts for 
around 84 percent of total U.S. emissions (EPA 2011). Accordingly, it has been used as the 
unit of measurement for calculating the atmospheric impact of any economic activity – hence 
the term ‘carbon footprint’ (Carbon Trust 2007a). In particular, the product carbon footprint 
refers to the total volume of greenhouse gas emissions (measured in carbon dioxide 
equivalents) associated with the product across its entire life cycle from the extraction of raw 
material, through the manufacturing process, usage, and even its disposal (CenSA 2007). 
In addition to green electricity, recycled content, and biodegradable packaging and 
waste, investments in the measurement and management of product carbon footprints have 
given firms the right to attach a “carbon footprint label” to their products. For example, 
grocery giant Tesco has initiated carbon footprint labeling on several product categories 
including orange juice, light bulbs, and washing detergent (Carbon Trust 2007b). Companies 
including Wal-Mart, PepsiCo, and Coca-Cola have similar initiatives in the works.  On the 
consumer side, market research suggests that 67 percent of consumers are more likely to buy 
a product with a low carbon footprint (Gfk NOP 2006), 44 percent would switch to such a 
product even if it was not their first choice, and 43 percent would pay more for products that 
help them lower their own carbon footprint (LEK 2007). This suggests that carbon footprint 
 62 
 
labels and investments in reducing product carbon footprints are strategic variables with 
which firms can differentiate their products in the minds of consumers. 
It can be prohibitively costly and technologically daunting for firms of any substantial 
size to reduce their product carbon footprints to zero internally at source or at the smokestack. 
Alternatively, with no operational adjustment, firms can offset their emissions in the carbon 
market. Carbon offsets can be purchased from governmental or independent intermediaries 
who then employ the offset payments to support environmental projects, which are aimed at 
either preventing the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere or reducing/recapturing 
the generated emissions. Not surprisingly, many firms have already begun to actively engage 
in the voluntary carbon market to become more environmentally engaged and lower their 
product carbon footprints through the support of external environmental projects. The size of 
the carbon market has continued to increase in recent years, with the value of the voluntary 
offset market increasing from US $414 million in 2010 to $569 million in 2011 (World Bank 
2012).  
Carbon offsetting is distinct from internal emission-reducing initiatives – it does not 
require firms to undergo direct alterations or replacements to their existing operations and is 
independent of the physical characteristics of the products produced. In addition, due to the 
external nature of carbon offsetting, firms can voluntarily participate in and out of the carbon 
market in a relatively flexible manner. Since no firm is without negative environmental 
externalities – i.e., no firm can have pollution-free operations – opportunities and incentives 
exist for firms to invest in the carbon market, offset some of their product carbon footprints, 
and become more environment-friendly, especially if it can lead to a more favourable public 
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opinion and/or if firms can use their investments as a way of differentiating their products in 
the marketplace (Amacher et al. 2004).   
With this in mind, the objective of this essay is to investigate how the carbon market 
and the subsequent availability of the carbon offsetting mechanism impact competition and 
the environment. A theoretical model is developed where two firms, competing in established 
markets with existing products, are provided the option to engage in the voluntary carbon 
market as a way to reduce their product carbon footprints, become more environment-
friendly, and capture consumer willingness to pay. Focusing on firms’ direct response to the 
carbon market and the gradual adoption of carbon offsetting as a widespread initiative can 
provide a clear understanding of the conditions under which the carbon market leads to a 
win-win outcome (benefits firms and the environment) or becomes a necessary evil.  
4.2 Related Literature and Contribution 
 Empirical research on environmentally concerned, ‘green’ consumers has identified 
factors that influence attitude toward environmental issues, preference for environmentally 
friendly attributes and production methods, and willingness to pay for green products (e.g., 
Luchs et al. 2007; Mohr and Webb 2005). Theoretical work, on the other hand, has focused 
more on analysing market and social effects of various environmental strategies (e.g., green 
advertising and green product labelling) across different contexts such as new product and 
(environmental) quality decisions, reactive compliance and voluntary over-compliance to 
environmental policy, information asymmetry, and international trade.  
 Among the theoretical research that considers a competitive context, in a vertically 
differentiated duopoly, Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) examine the impact of 
various policy instruments on aggregate emissions and social welfare and find that maximum 
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unit emission standards reduce unit emissions of both products, but increase sales and lead to 
an increase in aggregate emissions. In a similar manner, Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) 
also look at the implications of several tax-subsidy policies. With respect to international 
exchange, Greaker (2006) considers a trade model where products differ in environmental 
quality (vertical differentiation) as well as in taste (horizontal differentiation) and finds that 
voluntary labelling is better than regulatory environmental standards in enhancing global 
welfare. However, Eriksson (2004), in a horizontal duopoly, finds restricted support for the 
voluntary internalization of negative externalities by environmentally concerned consumers 
as a replacement for environmental regulation.  
 On the other hand, theoretical models with a demand-side focus have looked at the 
impact of the size and composition of environmentally concerned markets. For example, 
Rodriguez-Ibeas (2007), in a vertically differentiated duopoly, looks at how the size of the 
green market impacts social welfare and shows that increases in the market proportion of 
environmentally sensitive consumers may not always lead to environmentally beneficial 
outcomes. Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero (2002) conduct a similar analysis but with 
a focus on the maximum level of environmental awareness in green markets.  
 Several theoretical studies have also focused on decisions regarding (environmental) 
quality and/or environment-friendly technology investments, and the resulting level of 
product differentiation. Amacher et al. (2004) consider a vertically differentiated duopoly 
where green product labelling and differences in the efficiency in investments affect the 
dispersion of product quality. They find that the welfare effect of labelling with respect to 
quality dispersion is ambiguous, but green product labelling is environmentally beneficial. 
Conrad (2005) investigates a duopoly where environmental quality is horizontally 
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differentiated and looks at cases under which firms either both produce the highest 
environmental quality or choose maximum product differentiation. Bagnoli and Watts (2003) 
consider the effect of competition and find that a less competitive environment can result in a 
greater provision of the public good. Kotchen (2005) considers the availability of substitutes 
for the public good and investigates how this can possibly crowd out direct donations, and 
ultimately reduce overall environmental quality. In a monopoly setting, Chen (2001) looks at 
the provision of environmental quality under different marketing schemes (mass versus self-
selection) and environmental regulation.  
Also close to this work is research on green product labelling, which looks at the 
value of certified or noncertified claims of products that meets the objectives of environment-
sensitive, “green” consumers. Ibanez and Grolleau (2008) investigate the effect of different 
eco-label schemes in a vertically differentiated duopoly and find that a green product label 
cannot in itself fully internalize the negative environmental externality and can only act as an 
effective substitute to regulation under restrictive labelling cost conditions. Clemenz (2010), 
in a horizontally differentiated model, finds that the effect of eco-labels is also sensitive to 
the type of emission abatement method used by firms.  
Against this backstop, Essay 3 offers two main contributions. First, with the 
exception of Clemenz (2010), there is little theoretical work especially with a marketplace 
focus, which considers carbon offsetting as a strategic environmental initiative. Research has 
typically captured emission-related aspects using a single, general variable with either a 
variable or fixed cost specification. However, managing product carbon footprints internally 
within a firm’s operations and offsetting some of the product carbon footprint through the 
external carbon market are quite distinct. Not all firms may have the capabilities or slack to 
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invest in modern, low-emission technologies or undergo direct operational adjustments –
environmental management from an internal perspective may not be applicable to all firms. 
On the other hand, firms of any size and scope can easily participate in the carbon market, 
offset some of their emissions, and become more environment-friendly. By focusing on firms’ 
participation in carbon offsetting, this essay is able to provide insights on the aggregate 
effects of the voluntary carbon market on the overall market and industry. 
In addition, whereas Clemenz (2010) compared internal and external emission-
reducing initiatives, a general increasingly increasing cost structure is used which does not 
distinguish between different cost-related components associated with carbon offsets. The 
external nature of carbon offsetting, confusion in measurements and labelling, and disbelief 
in the effectiveness of offsets are all possible reasons for consumers to be sceptical toward 
carbon offset claims. Not surprisingly, studies indicate that 60 percent of consumers express 
doubts about carbon footprint claims by firms (LEK 2007), and 70 percent would value an 
independent assessment of such claims (Gfk NOP 2006). It is important to understand the 
different cost components associated with carbon offsets and offset claims that can impose 
additional costs on firms to effectively communicate their offset efforts to consumers. The 
following model simultaneously incorporates both the direct transaction costs of offsetting as 
well as offset communication costs.  
 Using a theoretical model, the marketplace and environmental implications of the 
carbon market and the subsequent availability of carbon offsets in terms of competition, firm 
profits, and aggregate environmental impact are looked into. With a specific focus on the 
carbon market and offsetting as an external product carbon footprint-reducing initiative, this 
essay aims to investigate (1) how existing firms with established technologies (that cannot be 
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altered, at least in the short-term) make decisions regarding their engagement in the voluntary 
carbon offset market, (2) how these decisions influence and is influenced by competition, and 
(3) the implications of the profit-maximizing equilibrium on the environment.  
4.3 Theoretical Model 
Consumer Utility  
In line with Hotelling (1929), a horizontally differentiated duopoly model is adopted 
where two firms are located at the endpoints of a unit interval (Firm 1 is located at point 0 
and Firm 2 at point 1). Consumers are distributed uniformly along the interval, where the 
distance between a firm and a consumer indicates the travel cost, on the part of the consumer, 
associated with purchasing the firm’s good. Each firm offers a single product variant with 
comparable tangible characteristics and differing intangible environmental characteristics, 
namely, the product carbon footprint. As the focus of this essay is specific to the existence of 
the carbon market and the availability of carbon offsetting as an environmental initiative, the 
model is developed in the context of existing products in an established market – i.e., 
changes to product quality or the manufacturing operations are suppressed. This simplifying 
assumption helps keep the focus on the direct effect of the carbon market.  
Product carbon footprints and intangible environmental attributes are assumed to be a 
non-excludable bad in consumption. To a certain degree, all consumers are assumed to be 
environmentally concerned such that, all things being equal, consumers prefer products with 
a lower environmental harm. This follows recent theoretical work, which considers 
environmental friendliness as a vertical attribute (e.g., Cremer and Thisse 1999; Bansal and 
Gangopadhyay 2003). In a similar manner, product carbon footprints are incorporated as a 
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vertical product attribute, where a higher product carbon footprint indicates a higher 
environmental impact and is associated with a greater disutility for consumers. 
 The willingness to pay for a consumer located at          for a unit of the product 
from Firm i (i=1, 2) is defined as: 
        |   |    .     (1) 
Here, V is the intrinsic utility from consuming one unit of the product. The second term, 
  |   |, indicates the disutility from the distance between the consumer’s location and the 
firm. Consumer sensitivity to this distance is captured in  , which without loss of generality, 
is normalized to 1. With similar production technologies, initial product carbon footprint for 
both firms is captured in ‘ .’ This indicates the total amount of greenhouse gas emission 
associated with a unit product (measured in the appropriate unit) across all stages of the 
product’s life including the extraction of input materials, production process, distribution to 
the end consumer, and post-consumption product disposal. The degree to which consumers 
are sensitive toward product carbon footprints – defined as “consumer environmental 
concern” – is captured in   (   ). By incorporating environmental concern directly into 
product valuations, it is assumed that all consumers act from a certain degree of “idealism” 
and obtain some disutility from having contributed to a public bad. Even if individuals 
recognize that the effect of their choice may be negligible at an aggregate level, they still 
derive a “warm glow” (“guilt”) from making environmentally friendly (harmful) purchases 
decisions and prefer products with a lower carbon footprint.  
The utility of a consumer located at         for a unit of the product by Firm i (i=1, 
2) can then be expressed as: 
    |   |       ,     (2) 
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where     is the price by Firm i. Throughout, consumer intrinsic utility (V) is assumed equal 
across consumers and sufficiently high such that all consumers purchase –this full market 
coverage assumption helps understand the industry-level effect of a widespread adoption of 
carbon offsets in established markets. 
If firms participate in the voluntary carbon offset market, they are able to reduce the 
net carbon footprint associated with their products. For many firms, making direct changes to 
their operations can be very costly or even unfeasible. Carbon offsetting, on the other hand, 
provides a non-disruptive and flexible alternative to managing product carbon footprints and 
does not require firms to undergo direct operational alterations. If firms offset some of their 
product carbon footprint in the carbon market and consumers are fully aware, then the utility 
of a consumer located at         when purchasing a unit of the product from Firm i (i=1, 2) 
is defined as: 
        |   |             ,     (3) 
where,    (      ) is the proportion of the initial product carbon footprint (emission per 
unit product) that Firm i offsets in the carbon market. As a result, the net carbon footprint 
associated with the product is reduced from   to        .  
Firm Profits 
Marginal production costs are assumed to be zero for both firms. As such, if a firm 
does not engage in carbon offsetting initiatives, the firm’s profit function is     , where    
and    are the price and market demand for Firm i, respectively. However, if a firm decides 
to offset some of its initial product carbon footprint, the cost associated with engaging in this 
external initiative involves two distinct components. The first is a variable cost component, 
which captures the actual cost of the offset transaction. Today, many carbon markets price 
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offsets at a fixed cost per metric ton of emissions (measured in carbon dioxide equivalents) – 
the variable cost specification is able to represent the current market trend. In addition, a 
quadratic fixed cost component is included to account for communication costs. Due to the 
external nature of carbon offsets and the intangible property of emissions, several aspects of 
the offsetting mechanism as well as the carbon market itself are susceptible to consumer 
skepticism. For example, consumers may be concerned about the effectiveness of a claimed 
offset transaction and whether the external project really is taking place. Consumers may also 
doubt whether the project is able to reduce or neutralize the claimed amount of atmospheric 
greenhouse gas emissions and may also have reservations on the method and accuracy of the 
calculation and monitoring of offsets.  
Taking these issues into account, it is assumed to be costly for the firm to credibly 
convince consumers of its external emission-management efforts, and this cost is further 
assumed to be increasing at an increasing rate. If a firm engages in carbon offsets, therefore, 
total cost for the firm becomes          
 , where  is the transaction cost parameter 
(recall that     is the level of emission per unit product which is offset in the carbon market 
by Firm i and   is the total quantity of products produced) and   is the parameter associated 
with credible communication. The communication cost increases as the firm offsets higher 
proportions of its initial emissions – i.e., it is more costly for firms to convince consumers of 
a 90 percent offset effort than for a 10 percent offset effort. By incorporating both a variable 
and fixed cost component, the above model recognizes that firms are faced not only with the 
cost of offsetting but also the cost of communicating, where credible communication 
becomes more difficult for higher offset proportions. 
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A two stage non-cooperative simultaneous game is solved for a 2 x 2 game, where 
each firm has a strategic choice between engaging in external offsets (‘offset’) or staying 
with the status quo (‘stay’), leading to four possible (Firm 1, Firm 2) combinations: (stay, 
stay), (offset, stay), (stay, offset), and (offset, offset). If firms do not engage in external 
carbon offsetting initiatives, they compete only in prices. On the other hand, if firms engage 
in carbon offsetting, then firms first decide on the proportion of the initial product carbon 
footprint to offset and then the price. As the focus of this essay is specifically on the impact 
of the voluntary carbon offset market, it is assumed that firms are endowed with fixed 
production technologies, which cannot be altered (at least in the short term). In addition, 
following the symmetry of the two firms, the ‘(offset, stay)’ strategy is used to represent an 
asymmetric adoption of carbon offsets – results and interpretations of the ‘(stay, offset)’ case 
can be made by reversing the order of the two firms.   
4.4  Findings and Discussion 
The profit-maximizing solutions for the proportion of initial product carbon footprint 
offset (  ) and price (  ), and resulting profit levels (  ) for each firm across the possible 
strategy combination in the two-stage simultaneous game are summarized below (see B1 in 
Appendix B for details). 
(stay, stay) (offset, stay) (offset, offset) 
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Regardless of whether one or both firms offset, if a firm engages in carbon offsetting, 
the proportion of the initial product carbon footprint that is offset (  ) is increasing in both 
consumer environmental concern ( ) and the level of initial emission ( ), and decreasing in 
the offset transaction cost parameter ( ) and offset communication cost parameter ( ). As 
consumers become more sensitive toward environmental aspects of products, firms have an 
incentive to engage more heavily in carbon offsetting and increase the valuation for their 
products in the ‘green’ domain. From the firm’s end, as manufacturing technologies become 
less efficient (or ‘dirtier’), greater participation in the voluntary carbon offset market can 
compensate for and mitigate damages from the higher initial product carbon footprint. On the 
other hand, if the market price for offsets increases and/or if consumers become more 
skeptical toward firms’ carbon offset efforts, then firms will cut down on their offsets.    
Finding 1. Equilibrium profits (  ) are decreasing in consumer environmental 
concern ( ) and initial emission ( ), increasing in the offset transaction cost parameter ( ) 
and communication cost parameter ( ), and lower than firm profits in the status quo strategy 
( (stay,     )) (see B2 in Appendix B for details).  
   
 
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
 
  
   
   
 
  
     
    (    ,     ) 
From a profit-maximizing perspective, each firm has an incentive to engage in carbon 
offsetting both when (1) both firms are not engaged in carbon offsetting initiatives and (2) 
only the competing firm is participating in the voluntary carbon offset market. Therefore, it 
can be seen that the equilibrium strategy is the (offset, offset) strategy, where both firms 
engage in offsetting portions of their initial product carbon footprints in the carbon market. 
Here, the profit-maximizing proportion of the initial product carbon footprint that is offset 
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(  ) for both firms are equal and is an increasing function of consumer environmental 
concern ( ) and the level of initial emission ( ), and a decreasing function of offset 
transaction costs ( ) and offset communication costs ( ).  
As consumer valuation toward firms’ carbon offsetting efforts increases and/or the 
costs associated with offsetting (transaction cost and/or communication cost) decrease, firms 
participate more heavily in the carbon market and increase the valuation of their products by 
making their products more ‘green’. However, even when the profitability of engaging in 
carbon offsets increases (i.e., consumers have high valuations for offsets and the associated 
costs are small), equilibrium profits for both firms are always lower than that of the status 
quo ‘(stay, stay)’ strategy. Despite the fact that all consumers value a lower net product 
carbon footprint, the symmetry of the firms cancels out the competitive advantages of carbon 
offsetting. These results reflect a classic prisoner’s dilemma – i.e., although both firms have 
individual incentives to participate in the carbon market, in fact, profits are higher for both 
firms when neither offset. What starts out as a profitable opportunity for firms may end up 
hurting firm profits. In the equilibrium strategy, therefore, an increase in environmental 
concern by consumers decreases firm profits while an increase in offset-associated cost 
parameters increases firm profits. At the end of the day, once both firms have set foot in the 
voluntary carbon market, carbon offsetting becomes a reactive measure to changes in 
consumer sentiment and, with the added costs of offsetting and offsetting communications, 
eventually hurts firm profits. A rise in consumer environmental concern or the level of initial 
product carbon footprint both end up imposing stricter standards for firms to comply with. 
Finding 1 suggests that, in saturated markets where manufacturing technologies are 
comparable, the voluntary carbon market and the subsequent availability of carbon offsetting 
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as an emission-reducing, ‘green’ initiative can end up becoming a necessary evil. Even if 
reducing the net product carbon footprint and making the product ‘cleaner’ can increase the 
valuation of the product, as competing firms begin to offset proportions of their emissions, 
the availability of this external initiative can become similar to a minimum quality standard 
(unit emission regulation) . Unless firms can find alternative ways in which to maintain their 
net product carbon footprint levels, firms may be locked into what appears to be a flexible 
mechanism to become environmentally friendly. In terms of profits, firms may be better off 
when carbon offsetting was either not available or when they are able to collude into not 
offsetting (stay in the status quo strategy). 
The above finding also has an important implication in terms of consumer education.  
In general, efforts aimed at informing consumers to enhance their knowledge and awareness 
toward various socio-environmental issues are conducted at a societal level. It is unrealistic 
for firms to expect sensitivity toward environmental aspects to be firm-specific. Although 
greater environmental concern on the part of consumers implies a greater appreciation for 
emission-reducing efforts such as carbon offsetting, Finding 1 shows that carbon offsets are 
only profitable if it can provide a competitive advantage. If only one firm engages in carbon 
offsets, then greater environmental concern increases firm profits and it is in the interest of 
that firm to further increase consumer sensitivity toward environmental aspects. However, 
the firm may need to caution against aggressive communication of their environmental 
initiatives. Once competing firms also adopt carbon offsets, not only will the profitability of 
carbon offsetting cancel out as discussed above, but the already built up environmental 
concern will also end up hurting firm profits even more. Furthermore, while it may be costly 
to increase consumer environmental awareness, lowering it may not even be possible. 
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Finding 2. Aggregate net emission in the equilibrium strategy (∑   
     ) is 
decreasing in consumer environmental concern ( ), increasing in the offset transaction cost 
parameter ( ) and offset communication cost parameter ( ), and can be increasing or 
decreasing in initial emission ( ) (see B2 in Appendix B for details). 
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Although the equilibrium (offset, offset) strategy does not result in the highest 
possible level of firm profits, aggregate net emission in the equilibrium strategy is always 
lower than that of the status quo strategy. Here, as consumers become more sensitive toward 
environmental aspects, firms engage in greater carbon offsets and, as a result, aggregate net 
emission decreases even more. On the other hand, as offset-associated costs increase, firms 
reduce their offsets and aggregate net emission increases on account of the decrease in the 
aggregate amount of emission offset. The effect of changes in the level of initial emission on 
aggregate net emission, however, is not as straightforward. As production technologies 
become ‘dirtier,’ product carbon footprint levels increase and aggregate level initial emission 
increases, but because firms also respond to higher initial emission by increasing their offset 
proportions, aggregate offsets also increase. If consumer skepticism toward external carbon 
offsetting efforts is high, and consequently, firms are not able to commit to high proportions 
of offsets, then as the initial product carbon footprint increases – even though firms respond 
by increasing their offsets – aggregate net emission increases. However, if the valuation for 
carbon offsetting efforts is high and firms are able commit and credibly convince consumers 
of high offset proportions, then aggregate offsets more than compensates for the increase in 
aggregate initial emission and, as a result, aggregate net emission decreases. Ironically, here, 
‘dirtier’ technologies can result in environmentally beneficial outcomes.  
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The above finding demonstrates a drawback to advancements in the voluntary carbon 
market. As long as external offsets are acknowledged as reductions in the firm’s negative 
externalities, carbon offsets can act as way of ‘paying off’ the firm’s environmental damage. 
Furthermore, even if the firm generates more emissions at source (increase in initial product 
carbon footprint), if the firm offsets a sufficient proportion of this emission, this can lead to 
an even lower net product carbon footprint – i.e., the firm can become ‘greener’ with a 
‘dirtier’ technology. Advancements in external approaches to emission reduction and 
environmental management have broadened the scope of what is considered ‘green’ in the 
minds of consumers. This makes it even more important for policymakers, environmentalists, 
and consumers to clarify what constitutes ‘green’ and how to evaluate various environment-
friendly claims by firms.  
Finding 2 also points to a geographical issue in terms of ‘green.’ As the atmosphere 
has no physical boundaries, efforts to mitigate emissions in one place are (theoretically) able 
to compensate for emissions generated in another area. Environmental projects such as 
alternative energy development and afforestation, however, are geographically constrained. 
Therefore, firms located in industry-intense areas will end up offsetting their emissions by 
supporting projects located elsewhere. On the one hand, the quality of air is neither firm-
specific nor country-specific, but its effect is global. On the other hand, if policymakers are 
concerned with the atmospheric impact within their geographic boundaries, then carbon 
offsetting projects held in other areas are not contributing to making a ‘cleaner’ locale. In that 
respect, both the local and global aspects associated with the voluntary carbon market need to 
be considered. Indeed, if local greenness is a concern, policymakers should revise methods 
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for example, which reward firms either (1) for internal at-source environmental initiatives or 
(2) for investing in offset projects of closer proximity. 
Finding 3. Aggregate net emission in the equilibrium strategy (∑   
     ) can be 
greater or less than aggregate net emission in the asymmetric strategies (∑                    ) 
(see B2 in Appendix B for details). 
 ∑   
     
  
  
 ∑      
  (offset,     )
 
It is expected that if both firms engage in carbon offsetting initiatives, societal level 
net emission decreases compared to when both firms stay in the status quo. However, if only 
one firm engages in carbon offsets, then the offsetting firm offsets a higher proportion of its 
initial emission than when both firms offset and also enjoys a higher market share. Therefore, 
it is unclear which strategy is optimal from a purely environmental perspective. The level of 
aggregate net emissions for the four possible strategic cases is given below (see B2 in 
Appendix B for details): 
(stay, stay) (offset, stay) (offset, offset) 
∑         ∑             (  
         
               
)  ∑              
       
  
  
 Regardless of whether one firm or both firms engage in carbon offsets, the magnitude 
of the decrease in aggregate net emission is increasing in consumer environmental concern 
and initial emission, and decreasing in the cost parameters associated with carbon offsetting 
(transaction cost and/or communication cost). Interestingly, it can be more environmentally 
beneficial when only one firm engages in carbon offsets than when both firms offset. If initial 
emission and consumer environmental concern are high and/or offset transaction costs are 
low, then the decrease in aggregate net emission is greater when only one firm offsets. On the 
other hand, if consumer skepticism toward the voluntary carbon market and firms’ external 
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emission-reducing initiatives is high, then aggregate net emission in the equilibrium strategy 
is lower than that of the asymmetric strategies. 
 The above finding suggests that, in a market where consumer sensitivity toward 
product carbon footprint levels is high, it can be more environmentally beneficial to have just 
one environmentally superior product than when all products are moderately ‘green.’ This is 
because the environmental quality of the ‘green’ product is greater when it is the only green 
product. On the other hand, even when consumers have high valuations for emission-
reducing initiatives, if the cost of overcoming consumer skepticism regarding the credibility 
and effectiveness of the carbon offset mechanism and claim is high, then the equilibrium 
strategy – while not the first best in terms of firm profits – can be the most environmentally 
beneficial. As discussed in Finding 2, increases in consumer environmental awareness can 
end up hurting firms once all firms are participating in the voluntary carbon market. However, 
environmentalists and policymakers may still have incentives to further educate and enhance 
consumer awareness. If, for example, increases in consumer environmental awareness lead to 
consumers becoming more skeptical toward external environmental initiatives and expect 
firms to focus more on internal approaches, then the average environmental quality of 
products increase and, what hurts firm profits will produce a more environmentally friendly 
outcome.   
4.5  Conclusion 
 The voluntary carbon market and carbon offsetting is distinct from traditional 
emission-reducing initiatives. It does not involve up-front investments and firms are able to 
participate in and out of the carbon market in a flexible manner. In addition, because the 
offsetting mechanism involves investments in external emission-neutralizing/reducing 
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projects, carbon offsetting does not require firms to make direct physical alterations to their 
operations. Firms of all sizes can participate in the carbon market and become environment-
friendly. This essay analyses a competitive model with a specific focus on how this external 
emission-reducing approach impacts firms and the environment. The results show that while 
the voluntary carbon market itself is flexible in terms of participation, opting out may no 
longer be an option. A disadvantage to its accessibility is that, once competing firms engage 
in this initiative, carbon offsetting becomes an environmental standard, which all firms need 
to comply with. At first glance, the relative ease with which firms can become ‘green’ can 
seem attractive. However, in thinking alike, firms need to consider the aftermaths of when 
this mechanism becomes a necessary evil.  
 In terms of environmental outcomes, the findings suggest that, in equilibrium, 
aggregate-level net emission can be decreasing in the level of initial emission generated by 
firms’ production technologies. Whereas the direct effect on an increase in initial emission is 
the increase in aggregate initial emission, if firms are able to increase consumer valuation 
toward offsetting efforts and the cost of credible communication is low, then one of the 
concerns of the carbon market is realised: offset provides firms with an excuse to generate 
more emissions and just ‘pay off’ the environmental externalities. Therefore, how consumers 
generalize and equalize or specify and distinctly evaluate environmental aspects of products 
can have significant effects in terms of the associated environmental results. Furthermore, it 
is demonstrated that aggregate net emission in the equilibrium strategy may not be the most 
environmentally beneficial. In fact, in some cases, having just one environmentally superior 
product is more environmentally beneficial than having two moderately green products. 
These findings suggest that it may even be in the interest of the policymaker not to impose 
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environmental standards on all firms but to provide mechanism under which greater 
differentiation in terms of environmental quality can be maintained.  
While the above analysis provides several insights of interest, it is far from exhaustive 
in the numerous issues that can impact and be impacted by external emission-reducing 
initiatives. For example, instead of an established market, considering growing markets with 
incomplete market coverage could unveil how market expansion influences firms’ decisions. 
In addition, while this simple model helps to focus specifically on the adoption of the carbon 
offsetting initiative, relaxing various firm-related variables to compare how differentiation 
across internal aspects – both technological and operational – can provide additional insight. 
Another potential extension is to look at differences in the credibility associated with 
individual firm’s green claims. Some firms may already be engaged in other environmental 
causes and have established a reputation for being environmentally responsible. Differences 
in consumer skepticism toward the credibility and effectiveness of firms’ environmental 
claims can potentially have differing effects.
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Table 1: Empirical Study Results 
 
 
Overall t-statistic Receptive
a
 Skeptic
a
 F-statistic
b
 
WTP($)   
   
Without Carbon Footprint Label 20.31  18.84 29.44                    9.54
* 
With Carbon Footprint Label (base product) 20.17  18.55 30.09                  10.04
* 
Change in WTP with Label - .14 - .40 - .29 .66                      .57           
Change in WTP($) from base product with label   
   
Internal Initiative   
   
20% Reduction - .49  -.39 - 1.87                    1.05 
40% Reduction 0.89  1.67 .75                      .64 
60% Reduction 3.20  5.44 3.23                    2.41 
Average 1.85 7.93
*
 2.90 2.55                      .21 
External Initiative   
   
20% Reduction .04  .01 .07                      .00 
 
40% Reduction 1.65  2.41 - 1.2                    7.54
* 
60% Reduction 4.50  6.96 - 2.69                  18.42
* 
Average 2.23 6.09
*
 3.48 - 1.48                  14.22
*
 
Control Scale   
   
Category Involvement 3.79  3.87 3.81                      .03 
Socially Responsible Consumption 2.84  2.87 2.99                    1.04 
Corporate Claim Believability 3.87  3.99 3.83                      .56 
 
3.58  3.75 3.85                      .35 
a
 Receptive respondents valued both internal and external initiatives and Skeptic respondents only valued the internal initiative 
b
 Participant segment (Receptive, Skeptic) was used as the between group factor  
*
 Test statistic is significant at the 0.05 level 
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Table 2: Model Notation 
 
  
Parameters/Variables Notation Explanation 
Market Segmentation 
Receptive consumers 
Skeptic consumers 
Environmental concern 
  
Valuation for carbon offsets 
 
Product Quality (ηψ) 
Quality efficiency 
Processing 
Production cost parameter 
 
Emission (τψ) 
Process inefficiency 
 
Carbon Offsets (kτψ) 
Proportion offset 
Offsetting cost parameter 
 
r   (0 < r < 1) 
s   (0 < s < 1) 
αj  (j = r,s) 
 
δ 
 
 
η 
ψ 
λ 
 
 
τ 
 
 
k 
m 
 
Market proportion of receptive consumers 
Market proportion of skeptic consumers 
Average segment specific impact of emission aspects on product valuation 
(j=r for receptive consumers and s for skeptic consumers) 
Receptive consumers’ valuation weight for carbon offsets 
 
 
Quality gained per unit of processing 
Level of processing 
Processing/production cost parameter 
 
 
Emission generated per unit of processing 
 
 
Fraction of generated emission that is offset 
Integrated cost parameter associated with carbon offsetting and 
communication 
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Table 3: Comparative Statics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                     Variables 
 
Parameters 
Price 
 
p* 
Profit 
 
π* 
Demand 
 
Q* 
Processing 
 
ψ* 
Offset fraction 
 
k* 
Emission Levels 
Initial 
τψ* 
Offset  
k*τψ* 
Net  
(1−k*)τψ* 
Receptive consumers r +/– +/– +/– +/– + +/– + +/– 
Skeptic consumers s +/– +/– +/– +/– – +/– – +/– 
Environmental concern 
     Receptive consumers 
 
αr 
 
+/– 
 
+/– 
 
+/– 
 
– 
 
+ 
 
– 
 
+ 
 
– 
     Skeptic consumers αs +/– +/– +/– – + – + – 
Offset Valuation δ + + + 0 + 0 + – 
Quality efficiency η + + + + – + 0 + 
Process inefficiency τ – – – – +/– +/– 0 +/– 
Production cost  λ – – – – + – 0 – 
Carbon offset cost  m – – – 0 – 0 – + 
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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 2: Experimental Study Stimulus 
 
Below is an illustration of the Apparel Company’s hooded sweatshirt product with product 
and carbon footprint information. 
 
 
 
How much are you willing to bid for the hooded sweatshirt described above in a size and 
color of your choice? 
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Figure 3: Consumer Expectation of Product Carbon Footprint  
 
(a) Internal initiative 
 
 
(b) External initiative 
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APPENDIX A 
 
A1 
 Within each segment there is a consumer who is indifferent between purchasing and 
not purchasing the product. Let  ̃  and  ̃  denote the indifferent consumer’s tolerance level 
for net emission in the receptive and skeptic consumer segments, respectively. By equating 
utilities of each consumer segment to 0 and solving for  , the indifferent consumers’ 
tolerance levels are: 
                                  ̃  
               
  
        ̃  
         
  
 
 Consumers purchase a unit of the product if their tolerance level is greater than that of 
the corresponding indifferent consumer, as described in Equation (a1). Since consumers are 
uniformly distributed along the interval [0,1] in each segment, the proportion of purchasing 
consumers within each segment is        ̃   for receptive consumers and        ̃   
for skeptic consumers. Taken together with the market proportion of the two segments, 
demand from receptive consumers is    and demand from skeptic consumers is    . The 
resulting market demand ( ) in Equation (2) in the text is the sum of these two terms.  
A2 
 Price. At the final stage, the monopolist chooses a price ( ) to maximize firm profits 
as described in Equation (3) in the text. Solving for the first order condition with respect to 
price, the resulting expression for price is given below:     
                ̃  
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 Carbon Offsets. Given the expression for price in Equation (a2), the firm chooses the 
fraction of the emission offset per product ( ) which maximizes profits given Equation (a2). 
Solving for the first order condition with respect to the fraction of emission offset per product 
yields three roots. By checking the second order condition evaluated at each root, the 
resulting expression for the profit-maximizing fraction of emission offset per product is:  
                                                             ̃  
      
             
 
 Processing. Given the expressions for price in Equation (a2) and fraction of emission 
offset per product in Equation (a3), the firm chooses the level of processing ( ) that 
maximizes profits given Equation (a2) and Equation (a3). Solving for the first order 
condition with respect to the level of processing yields three roots. By checking the second 
order condition evaluated at each root, the resulting expression for the profit-maximizing 
level of processing is given below: 
                                                 ̃  
                      
           
 
 Substituting the choice of processing in Equation (a4) into the fraction of emission 
offset per product in Equation (a3), and the resulting fraction of emission offset per product 
into price in Equation (a2), the solutions for the monopolist’s decisions are given below:  
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 The matrix of second derivatives evaluated at the above solution is verified to ensure 
that the solutions above represent a maximum. All the leading principle minors are of the 
required signs – representing a maximum. 
A3 
 Finding 1. Partial derivatives of processing (  ), the fraction of emission offset per 
product (  ), product contribution margin (   –      –          ), and total demand (  ) 
with respect to quality efficiency ( ) are given below:       
                                                                       
   
  
 
 
  
   
   
  
  
                
                          
   
     –      –           
  
 
                     
           
    
   
  
 
                     
  
    
 If the production condition is satisfied (i.e., η > τ), the signs of all four derivatives are 
determinate. The positive effect of process efficiency on product contribution margin and 
total demand effectively leads to an increase in firm profits (i.e.,       > 0). In addition, the 
net effect of the increase in processing and the decrease in the fraction of emission offset per 
product leaves the magnitude of emission offset per product unchanged (i.e.,           = 
0). Combined with the increase in processing and total demand, this leads to greater net 
emission both at the unit product level and in the aggregate (i.e.,               > 0, 
                > 0).  
 Finding 2. Partial derivatives of processing (  ), product contribution margin 
(   –      –          ), total demand (  ), the fraction of emission offset per product  
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(  ), initial emission per product (   ), and net emission per product (          ) with 
respect to process inefficiency ( ) are given below: 
                                                            
   
  
  
         
           
   
 (   –      –          )
  
  
         (                     )
            
    
   
  
  
                            
           
    
   
  
  
                               
                         
     
    
  
 
          
  
 
                      
           
     
 The negative effect of process inefficiency on product contribution margin and total 
demand leads to a net negative impact on firm profits. For atmospheric outcomes, if quality 
efficiency ( ) is greater than                     , then the partial derivative of the 
fraction of emission offset per product (  ) is negative and that of net emission per product 
(         ) is positive. This refers to Case 1 of Finding 2 in the text. If   is less than 
                    , then Case 2 holds. Here, the partial derivative of the fraction of 
emission offset per product is positive and both the net emission per product and total net 
emission are decreasing in process inefficiency.  
 Finding 3. Partial derivatives of processing (  ), the fraction of emission offset per 
product (  ), amount of emission offset per product (     ), and total demand (  ) with 
respect to consumer environmental concern (  , j=r,s) are given below:   
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 It follows from the negative effect on processing and positive effect on the fraction of 
emission offset per product, that environmental concern decreases both initial and net 
emission of the product (i.e.,        < 0,               < 0). If the partial derivative on 
total demand is positive and the magnitude outweighs the decrease in net emission per 
product, then net total emission also increases with environmental concern.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1 
(stay, stay) Strategy. Given consumer utility for a unit of the product as in Equation 
(2) in the text, the location of the consumer indifferent between purchasing from Firm 1 and 
Firm 2 is: 
                                                             ̂             .  
With full market coverage, demand for Firm 1 and Firm 2 can be expressed as  ̂ 
and     ̂ , respectively. Provided that both firms have marginal production costs of zero, 
profit functions are    ̂ for Firm 1 and       ̂  for Firm 2. When both firms do not engage 
in offsets, they compete only in prices. Simultaneously solving for both firms’ best response 
functions with respect to prices given the competitor’s price, the results for the status quo 
strategy in the text can be obtained.  
(offset, offset) Strategy. When both firms offset, the utility for a unit of the product 
is as in Equation (3) in the text and the location of the consumer indifferent between 
purchasing from Firm 1 and Firm 2 is: 
                                                ̂                       .  
As firms incur additional costs associated with offsetting, profit functions are 
           ̂     
  for Firm 1 and               ̂     
  for Firm 2. In the first 
stage, firms decide on the proportion of the initial product carbon footprint to offset ( ). Then 
the firms decide on prices. Using backward induction, prices are first solved for given offset 
decisions and then offset proportions are solved for taking into account the consequential 
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effects on prices and firm profits. In the last stage, simultaneously solving for both firms’ 
best response functions with respect to prices, the resulting expressions for prices are: 
                                              
 
 
(                  ) 
     
 
 
(                  ) 
In the first stage, simultaneously solving for both firm’s best response functions with 
respect to the proportion of the initial product carbon footprint offset given the subsequent 
decisions on prices as shown above in Equation (b3), the resulting level of offset proportions 
are: 
                                                                     
      
  
 
By substituting the above offset proportion into prices in Equation (b3), the resulting solution 
for price and firm profits for the (offset, offset) strategy in the text can be obtained.  
 In the (offset, offset) strategy, the condition for the offset proportion to be between 0 
and 1 is            . In addition, to make sure that the above solutions are profit-
maximizing, the matrix of second derivatives with respect to each decision variable evaluated 
at the profit-maximizing solution was analysed. The resulting condition is            . 
All interpretations were assessed in accordance with these conditions. 
(offset, stay) Strategy. Without loss of generality, results for the (offset, stay) case is 
provided – the results for the (stay, offset) case are symmetric. When only Firm 1 offsets, the 
utility for a unit of the product by Firm 1 is as in Equation (3) in the text and that by Firm 2 is 
as in Equation (2) in the text. By equating the two utilities, the location of the consumer 
indifferent between purchasing from Firm 1 and Firm 2 is: 
                                                          ̂                    
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Firm 1 has two decision variables (offset, price) while Firm 2 has one (price). 
Therefore, in the first stage, Firm 1 decides on the proportion of the initial product carbon 
footprint to offset taking into account its effect on its own price and the price of Firm 2. 
Using backward induction, simultaneously solving for both firms’ best response functions 
with respect to prices, the resulting expressions are: 
                                                                
 
 
          
     
 
 
         
Given the above profit-maximizing decisions on prices, solving for Firm 1’s decision 
on the proportion of initial product carbon footprint offset, the resulting offset proportion is: 
                                                              
       
            
 
By substituting the above offset proportion into prices in Equation (b6), the resulting solution 
for price and firm profits for the (offset, stay) strategy in the text can be obtained.  
In the (offset, stay) strategy, the condition for the offset proportion to be between 0 
and 1 is                       . In addition, to make sure that the above 
solutions are profit-maximizing, the matrix of second derivatives with respect to each 
decision variable evaluated at the profit-maximizing solution was analysed. The resulting 
condition is            . All interpretations were assessed in accordance with these 
conditions. 
B2 
Finding 1.Comparative statics for firm profits in the (offset, offset) strategy with 
respect to consumer environmental concern ( ), initial emission ( ), offset transaction cost 
parameter ( ), and offset communication cost parameter ( ) are as follows: 
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Assuming that the firms offset (   ), the signs of the above equations are all determinate. 
Equilibrium profits are decreasing in consumer environmental concern and initial emission, 
and increasing in the offset transaction cost parameter and the communication cost parameter. 
 The difference between firm profits in the status quo ‘(stay, stay)’ strategy and the 
equilibrium ‘(offset, offset)’ strategy is as follows:  
                                                       (    ,     )    
  
        
   
 
Finding 2.Comparative statics for aggregate net emissions in the equilibrium ‘(offset, 
offset)’ strategy with respect to consumer environmental concern ( ), offset transaction cost 
parameter ( ), offset communication cost parameter ( ), and initial emission ( ) are as 
follows: 
                                      
 ∑   
     
  
  
  
  
   
 ∑   
     
  
 
  
  
   
 ∑   
     
  
 
       
   
   
 ∑   
     
  
   
      
  
 
Assuming that the firms offset (   ), aggregate level net emissions in the equilibrium 
strategy is decreasing in consumer environmental concern and increasing in the offset 
transaction cost parameter and the communication cost parameter. On the other hand, the 
directional sign of the partial derivative of aggregate net emissions with respect to initial 
emission is not determinate. If           then aggregate net emissions is increasing in 
initial emission and if           then aggregate net emissions is decreasing in initial 
emission.  
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Finding 3. It is straightforward to see that with full market coverage and comparable 
production technologies, societal-level aggregate net emission for the status quo ‘(stay, stay)’ 
strategy is  . 
Societal-level aggregate net emission in the equilibrium ‘(offset, offset)’ strategy is 
the sum of the two firm-specific aggregate net emissions. Taking the profit-maximizing 
proportion of initial product carbon footprint offset (  ) and the resulting prices (  ) and firm 
demands (  ), aggregate net emission for each firm is: 
                                                     
     
  
            
   
 
By adding the two firm-specific aggregate net emissions, the resulting societal-level 
aggregate net emissions for the (offset, offset) strategy in the text can be obtained. 
Societal-level aggregate net emission in the asymmetric ‘(offset, stay)’ strategy is the 
sum Firm 1’s post-offset aggregate net emission level and Firm 2’s aggregate initial emission. 
Taking the profit-maximizing proportion of initial product carbon footprint offset by Firm 1 
(  ) and the resulting prices (  ) and firm demands (  ), aggregate net emission for each firm 
is: 
                                         
                         
               
 
    
              
            
 
By adding the two firm-specific aggregate net emissions, the resulting societal-level 
aggregate net emissions for the (offset, stay) strategy in the text can be obtained. 
Equations for the aggregate net emission in the (offset, offset) strategy and the (offset, 
stay) strategies are: 
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                                   ∑     
     
 
 
 
            
   
 
∑         (offset,     )
 
  (  
         
               
) 
The difference between aggregate net emissions in the (offset, offset) strategy and the 
(offset, stay) strategy is: 
                                           ∑     
     
 
 
 ∑         (offset, no)
 
             
 
       
  
(  
     
               
) 
The directional sign of the above equation is determined by ‘     √            ’. If 
     √    is less than         , then the above equation is negative and aggregate net 
emission in the (offset, offset) strategy is lower than that of the (offset, stay) strategy. 
However, if      √    is greater than         , then the above equation is positive 
and aggregate net emission in the (offset, offset) strategy is greater than that of the (offset, 
stay) strategy.  
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